“Here is the law; and under it exists the law of slavery in the different States.  By virtue of this very principle it cannot extend one inch beyond its own territorial limits.  A State cannot regulate the relation of master and slave, of owner and property, the manner and title of descent, or anything else, one inch beyond its territory.  Then you cannot, by virtue of the law of slavery, if it makes slaves property in a State, if you please, move that property out of the State.  It ends whenever you pass from that State.  You may pass into another State that has a like law; and if you do, you hold it by virtue of that law; but the moment you pass beyond the limits of the slaveholding States, all title to the property called property in slaves, there ends.  Under such a law slaves cannot be carried as property into the Territories, or anywhere else beyond the States authorizing it.  It is not property anywhere else.  If the Constitution of the United States gives any other and further character than this to slave property, let us acknowledge it fairly and end all strife about it.  If it does not, I ask in all candor, that men on the other side shall say so, and let this point be settled.  What is the point we are to inquire into?  It is this:  does the Constitution of the United States make slaves property beyond the jurisdiction of the States authorizing slavery?  If it only acknowledges them as property within that jurisdiction, it has not extended the property one inch beyond the State line; but if, as the Supreme Court seems to say, it does recognize and protect them as property further than State limits, and more than the State laws do, then, indeed, it becomes like other property.  The Supreme Court rests this claim upon this clause of the Constitution:  ’No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.’  Now the question is, does that guaranty it?  Does that make it the same as other property?  The very fact that this clause makes provision on the subject of persons bound to service, shows that the framers of the Constitution did not regard it as other property.  It was a thing that needed some provision; other property did not.  The insertion of such a provision shows that it was not regarded as other property.  If a man’s horse stray from Delaware into Pennsylvania, he can go and get it.  Is there any provision in the Constitution for it?  No.  How came this to be there, if a slave is property?  If it is the same as other property, why have any provision about it?’”