This was the hazardous situation into which the Democratic managers chose to thrust one of the most momentous pieces of legislation in our political history-the Kansas-Nebraska bill.  The responsibility for it is clearly on the shoulders of Stephen A. Douglas.  The over-land travel to the Pacific coast had made it necessary to remove the Indian title to Kansas and Nebraska, and to organize them as Territories, in order to afford protection to emigrants; and Douglas, chairman of the Senate committee on Territories, introduced a bill for such organization in January, 1854.  Both these prospective Territories had been made free soil forever by the compromise of 1820; the question of slavery had been settled, so far as they were concerned; but Douglas consented, after a show of opposition, to reopen Pandora’s box.  His original bill did not abrogate the Missouri compromise, and there seems to have been no general Southern demand that it should do so.  But Douglas had become intoxicated by the unexpected success of his “popular sovereignty” make-shift in regard to the Territories of 1850; and a notice of an amendment to be offered by a southern senator, abrogating the Missouri compromise, was threat or excuse sufficient to bring him to withdraw the bill.  A week later, it was re-introduced with the addition of “popular sovereignty”:  all questions pertaining to slavery in these Territories, and in the States to be formed from them, were to be left to the decision of the people, through their representatives; and the Missouri compromise of 1820 was declared “inoperative and void,” as inconsistent with the principles of the territorial legislation of 1850.  It must be remembered that the “non-intervention” of 1850 had been confessedly based on no constitutional principle whatever, but was purely a matter of expediency; and that “non-intervention” in Utah and New Mexico was no more inconsistent with the prohibition of slavery in Kansas and Nebraska than “non-intervention” in the Southwest Territory, sixty years before, had been inconsistent with the prohibition of slavery in the Northwest Territory.  Whether Douglas is to be considered as too scrupulous, or too timid, or too willing to be terrified, it is certain that his action was unnecessary.

After a struggle of some months, the Kansas-Nebraska bill became law.  The Missouri compromise was abrogated, and the question of the extension of slavery to the territories was adrift again, never to be got rid of except through the abolition of slavery itself by war.  The demands of the South had now come fully abreast with the proposal of Douglas:  that slavery should have permission to enter all the Territories, if it could.  The opponents of the extension of slavery, at first under the name of “Anti-Nebraska men,” then of the Republican party, carried the elections for representatives in Congress in 1854-’55, and narrowly missed carrying the Presidential election of 1856.  The percentage of Democratic losses in the congressional districts of the North was sufficient to leave Douglas with hardly any supporters in Congress from his own section.  The Democratic party was converted at once into a solid South, with a northern attachment of popular votes which was not sufficient to control very many Congressmen or electoral votes.