It has been objected against this measure that it is a compromise.  It has been said that it is a compromise of principle, or of a principle.  Mr. President, what is a compromise?  It is a work of mutual concession—­an agreement in which there are reciprocal stipulations—­a work in which, for the sake of peace and concord, one party abates his extreme demands in consideration of an abatement of extreme demands by the other party:  it is a measure of mutual concession—­a measure of mutual sacrifice.  Undoubtedly, Mr. President, in all such measures of compromise, one party would be very glad to get what he wants, and reject what he does not desire, but which the other party wants.  But when he comes to reflect that, from the nature of the Government and its operations, and from those with whom he is dealing, it is necessary upon his part, in order to secure what he wants, to grant something to the other side, he should be reconciled to the concession which he has made, in consequence of the concession which he is to receive, if there is no great principle involved, such as a violation of the Constitution of the United States.  I admit that such a compromise as that ought never to be sanctioned or adopted.  But I now call upon any senator in his place to point out from the beginning to the end, from California to New Mexico, a solitary provision in this bill which is violative of the Constitution of the United States.

Sir, adjustments in the shape of compromise may be made without producing any such consequences as have been apprehended.  There may be a mutual forbearance.  You forbear on your side to insist upon the application of the restriction denominated the Wilmot proviso.  Is there any violation of principle there?  The most that can be said, even assuming the power to pass the Wilmot proviso, which is denied, is that there is a forbearance to exercise, not a violation of, the power to pass the proviso.  So, upon the other hand, if there was a power in the Constitution of the United States authorizing the establishment of slavery in any of the Territories—­a power, however, which is controverted by a large portion of this Senate—­if there was a power under the Constitution to establish slavery, the forbearance to exercise that power is no violation of the Constitution, any more than the Constitution is violated by a forbearance to exercise numerous powers, that might be specified, that are granted in the Constitution, and that remain dormant until they come to be exercised by the proper legislative authorities.  It is said that the bill presents the state of coercion—­that members are coerced, in order to get what they want, to vote for that which they disapprove.  Why, sir, what coercion is there? * * * Can it be said upon the part of our Northern friends, because they have not got the Wilmot proviso incorporated in the territorial part of the bill, that they are coerced—­wanting California, as they do, so much—­to vote for the bill, if they do vote for it?  Sir, they