be virtually represented, and its owners obtain a like
power in legislation, and in the choice of the President?
Property is not confined in slaves, but exists in
houses, stores, ships, capital in trade, and manufactures.
To secure to the owners of property in slaves greater
political power than is allowed to the owners of other
and equivalent property, seems to be contrary to our
theory of the equality of personal rights, inasmuch
as the citizens of some States thereby become entitled
to other and greater political power than the citizens
of other States. The present House of Representatives
consist of one hundred and eighty-one members, which
are apportioned among the States in a ratio of one
representative for every thirty-five thousand federal
members, which are ascertained by adding to the whole
number of free persons, three-fifths of the slaves.
According to the last census, the whole number of
slaves within the United was 1,191,364, which entitles
the States possessing the same to twenty representatives,
and twenty presidential electors more than they would
be entitled to, were the slaves excluded. By
the last census, Virginia contained 582,104 free persons,
and 392,518 slaves. In any of the States where
slavery is excluded, 582,104 free persons would be
entitled to elect only sixteen representatives, while
in Virginia, 582,104 free persons, by the addition
of three-fifths of her slaves, become entitled to elect,
and do in fact elect, twenty-three representatives,
being seven additional ones on account of her slaves.
Thus, while 35,000 free persons are requisite to elect
one representative in a State where slavery is prohibited,
25,559 free persons in Virginia may and do elect a
representative: so that five free persons in
Virginia have as much power in the choice of Representatives
to Congress, and in the appointment of presidential
electors, as seven free persons in any of the States
in which slavery does not exist.
This inequality in the apportionment of representatives
was not misunderstood at the adoption of the Constitution,
but no one anticipated the fact that the whole of
the revenue of the United States would be derived
from indirect taxes (which cannot be supposed to spread
themselves over the several States according to the
rule for the apportionment of direct taxes), but it
was believed that a part of the contribution to the
common treasury would be apportioned among the States
by the rule for the apportionment of representatives.
The States in which slavery is prohibited, ultimately,
though with reluctance, acquiesced in the disproportionate
number of representatives and electors that was secured
to the slaveholding States. The concession was,
at the time, believed to be a great one, and has proved
to have been the greatest which was made to secure
the adoption of the Constitution.
Great, however, as this concession was, it was definite,
and its full extent was comprehended. It was
a settlement between the original thirteen States.
The considerations arising out of their actual condition,
their past connection, and the obligation which all
felt to promote a reformation in the Federal Government,
were peculiar to the time and to the parties, and
are not applicable to the new States, which Congress
may now be willing to admit into the Union.