abolition of domestic slavery was the greatest object of desire.”  He believed that “the sacred side was gaining daily recruits,” and confidently looked to the young for the accomplishment of this good work.  In fitful sympathy with Jefferson was another honored son of Virginia, the Orator of Liberty, Patrick Henry, who, while confessing that he was a master of slaves, said:  “I will not, I cannot justify it.  However culpable my conduct, I will so far pay my devoir to virtue as to own the excellence and rectitude of her precepts, and lament my want of conformity to them.”  At this very period, in the Legislature of Maryland, on a bill for the relief of oppressed slaves, a young man, afterwards by consummate learning and forensic powers acknowledged head of the American bar, William Pinkney, in a speech of earnest, truthful eloquence,—­better for his memory than even his professional fame,—­branded Slavery as “iniquitous and most dishonorable,” “founded in a disgraceful traffic,” “its continuance as shameful as its origin,” and he openly declared, that “by the eternal principles of natural justice, no master in the State has a right to hold his slave in bondage for a single hour.”

* * * * *

At the risk of repetition, but for the sake of clearness, review now this argument, and gather it together.  Considering that Slavery is of such an offensive character that it can find sanction only in “positive law,” and that it has no such “positive” sanction in the Constitution,—­that the Constitution, according to its preamble, was ordained to “establish justice” and “secure the blessings of liberty,”—­that, in the Convention which framed it, and also elsewhere at the time, it was declared not to sanction slavery,—­that, according to the Declaration of Independence, and the Address of the Continental Congress, the nation was dedicated to “liberty,” and the “rights of human nature,”—­that, according to the principles of the common law, the Constitution must be interpreted openly, actively, and perpetually for freedom,—­that, according to the decision of the Supreme Court, it acts upon slaves, not as property, but as PERSONS,—­that, at the first organization of the national Government under Washington, Slavery had no national favor, existed nowhere on the national territory, beneath the national flag, but was openly condemned by Nation, Church, Colleges, and Literature of the time,—­and, finally, that, according to an amendment of the Constitution, the National Government can exercise only powers delegated to it, among which is none to support Slavery,—­considering these things, Sir, it is impossible to avoid the single conclusion, that Slavery is in no respect a national institution, and that the Constitution nowhere upholds property in man.

There is one other special provision of the Constitution, which I have reserved to this stage, not so much from its superior importance, but because it fitly stands by itself.  This alone, if practically applied, would carry Freedom to all within its influence.  It is an amendment proposed by the First Congress, as follows: