be a mighty theatre, in which this government assumes the right of exercising this unparalleled power.  And it will be; there is no concealment, it is intended to be exercised.  Nor will it stop until the very name and nature of the old partners be overwhelmed by new-corners into the confederacy.  Sir, the question goes to the very root of the power and influence of the present members of this Union.  The real intent of this article, is, therefore, an injury of most serious import; and is to be settled only by a recurrence to the known history and known relations of this people and their Constitution.  These, I maintain, support this position, that the terms “new States,” in this article, do not intend new political sovereignties, with territorial annexations, to be created without the original limits of the United States. * * *

But there is an argument stronger even than all those which have been produced, to be drawn from the nature of the power here proposed to be exercised.  Is it possible that such a power, if it had been intended to be given by the people, should be left dependent upon the effect of general expressions, and such, too, as were obviously applicable to another subject, to a particular exigency contemplated at that time?  Sir, what is this power we propose now to usurp?  Nothing less than a power changing all the proportions of the weight and influence possessed by the potent sovereignties composing this Union.  A stranger is to be introduced to an equal share without their consent.  Upon a principle pretended to be deduced from the Constitution, this government, after this bill passes, may and will multiply foreign partners in power at its own mere motion; at its irresponsible pleasure; in other words, as local interests, party passions, or ambitious views may suggest.  It is a power that from its nature never could be delegated; never was delegated; and as it breaks down all the proportions of power guaranteed by the Constitution to the States, upon which their essential security depends, utterly annihilates the moral force of this political conduct.  Would this people, so wisely vigilant concerning their rights, have transferred to Congress a power to balance, at its will, the political weight of any one State, much more of all the States, by authorizing it to create new States, at its pleasure, in foreign countries, not pretended to be within the scope of the Constitution, or the conception of the people at the time of passing it?  This is not so much a question concerning the exercise of sovereignty, as it is who shall be sovereign—­whether the proprietors of the good old United States shall manage their own affairs in their own way; or whether they, and their Constitution, and their political rights, shall be trampled under foot by foreigners, introduced through a breach of the Constitution.  The proportion of the political weight of each sovereign State constituting this Union depends upon the number of the States which have voice under the compact.