In mentioning my objections to the treaty itself, I have already stated the advantages which in my opinion would result to the United States from the non-existence of that instrument; I will not repeat, but proceed at once to examine what losses may accrue that can be set off against those advantages.

The further detention of the posts, the national stain that will result from receiving no reparation for the spoliations on our trade, and the uncertainty of a final adjustment of our differences with Great Britain, are the three evils which strike me as resulting from a rejection of the treaty; and when to those considerations I add that of the present situation of this country, of the agitation of the public mind, and of the advantages that will arise from union of sentiments, however injurious and unequal I conceive the treaty to be, however repugnant it may be to my feelings, and perhaps to my prejudices, I feel induced to vote for it, and will not give my assent to any proposition which will imply its rejection.  But the conduct of Great Britain since the treaty was signed, the impressment of our seamen, and their uninterrupted spoliations on our trade, especially by seizing our vessels laden with provisions, a proceeding which they may perhaps justify by one of the articles of the treaty, are such circumstances as may induce us to pause awhile, in order to examine whether it is proper, immediately and without having obtained any explanation thereon, to adopt the resolution on the table, and to pass, at present, all the laws necessary to carry the treaty into effect.

Whatever evils may follow a rejection of the treaty, they will not attend a postponement.  To suspend our proceedings will not throw us into a situation which will require new negotiations, new arrangements on the points already settled and well understood by both parties.  It will be merely a delay, until an explanation of the late conduct of the British towards us may be obtained, or until that conduct may be altered.  If, on the contrary, we consent to carry the treaty into effect, under the present circumstances, what will be our situation in future?  It is by committing the most wanton and the most unprovoked aggressions on our trade; it is by seizing a large amount of our property as a pledge for our good behavior, that Great Britain has forced the nation into the present treaty.  If by threatening new hostilities, or rather by continuing her aggressions, even after the treaty is made, she can force us also to carry it into effect, our acquiescence will be tantamount to a declaration that we mean to submit in proportion to the insults that are offered to us; and this disposition being once known, what security have we against new insults, new aggressions, new spoliations, which probably will lay the foundation of some additional sacrifices on ours?  It has been said, and said with truth, that to put up with the indignities we have received without obtaining any reparation, which will probably be the effect of defeating the treaty, is highly dishonorable to the nation.