waters of the Mississippi, even if their boundary line leaves to the southward the sources of that river.  Had not that been the intention of Great Britain the line would have been settled at once by the treaty, according to either of the two only rational ways of doing it in conformity to the treaty of 1783, that is to say, by agreeing that the line should run from the northernmost sources of the Mississippi, either directly to the western extremity of the Lake of the Woods, or northwardly till it intersected the line to be drawn due west from that lake.  But by repeating the article of the treaty of 1783; by conceding the free use of our ports on the river, and by the insertion of the fourth article, we have admitted that Great Britain, in all possible events, has still a right to navigate that river from its source to its mouth.  What may be the future effects of these provisions, especially as they regard our intercourse with Spain, it is impossible at present to say; but although they can bring us no advantage, they may embroil us with that nation:  and we have already felt the effect of it in our late treaty with Spain, since we were obliged, on account of that clause of the British treaty, to accept as a gift and a favor the navigation of that river which we had till then claimed as a right.

But if, leaving commercial regulations, we shall seek in the treaty for some provisions securing to us the free navigation of the ocean against any future aggressions on our trade, where are they to be found?  I can add nothing to what has been said on the subject of contraband articles:  it is, indeed, self-evident, that, connecting our treaty with England on that subject with those we have made with other nations, it amounts to a positive compact to supply that nation exclusively with naval stores whenever they may be at war.  Had the list of contraband articles been reduced—­had naval stores and provisions, our two great staple commodities, been declared not to be contra-band, security would have been given to the free exportation of our produce; but instead of any provision being made on that head, an article of a most doubtful nature, and on which I will remark hereafter, has been introduced.  But I mean, for the present, to confine my observations to the important question of free bottoms making free goods.  It was with the utmost astonishment that I heard the doctrine advanced on this floor, that such a provision, if admitted, would prove injurious to America, inasmuch as in case of war between this country and any other nation, the goods of that nation might be protected by the English flag.  It is not to a state of war that the benefits of this provision would extend; but it is the only security which neutral nations can have against the legal plundering on the high seas, so often committed by belligerent powers.  It is not for the sake of protecting an enemy’s property; it is not for the sake of securing an advantageous carrying trade; but it is in order effectually to secure