people of America, I can say, notwithstanding what the honorable gentleman has alleged, that this government is not completely consolidated; nor is it entirely federal.  Who are the parties to it?  The people—­not the people as composing one great body, but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties.  Were it, as the gentleman asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment, and as a majority have adopted it already, the remaining States would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated it.  Were it such a government as is suggested, it would be now binding on the people of this State, without having had the privilege of deliberating upon it; but, sir, no State is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent.  Should all the States adopt it, it will be then a government established by the thirteen States of America, not through the intervention of the legislatures, but by the people at large.  In this particular respect, the distinction between the existing and proposed governments is very material.  The existing system has been derived from the dependent, derivative authority of the legislatures of the States; whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people.  If we look at the manner in which alterations are to be made in it, the same idea is in some degree attended to.  By the new system, a majority of the States cannot introduce amendments; nor are all the States required for that purpose; three fourths of them must concur in alterations; in this there is a departure from the federal idea.  The members to the national House of Representatives are to be chosen by the people at large, in proportion to the numbers in the respective districts.  When we come to the Senate, its members are elected by the States in their equal and political capacity; but had the government been completely consolidated, the Senate would have been chosen by the people, in their individual capacity, in the same manner as the members of the other house.  Thus it is of complicated nature, and this complication, I trust, will be found to exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as of a mere confederacy.  If Virginia were separated from all the States, her power and authority would extend to all cases; in like manner, were all powers vested in the general government, it would be a consolidated government; but the powers of the federal government are enumerated; it can only operate in certain cases:  it has legislative powers on defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction.