provide.  The local interests of a State ought in every case to give way to the interests of the Union; for when a sacrifice of one or the other is necessary, the former becomes only an apparent, partial interest, and should yield, on the principle that the small good ought never to oppose the great one.  When you assemble from your several counties in the Legislature, were every member to be guided only by the apparent interests of his county, government would be impracticable.  There must be a perpetual accommodation and sacrifice of local advantages to general expediency; but the spirit of a mere popular assembly would rarely be actuated by this important principle.  It is therefore absolutely necessary that the Senate should be so formed, as to be unbiased by false conceptions of the real interests, or undue attachment to the apparent good of their several States.

Gentlemen indulge too many unreasonable apprehensions of danger to the State governments; they seem to suppose that the moment you put men into a national council, they become corrupt and tyrannical, and lose all their affection for their fellow-citizens.  But can we imagine that the Senators will ever be so insensible of their own advantage, as to sacrifice the genuine interest of their constituents?  The State governments are essentially necessary to the form and spirit of the general system.  As long, therefore, as Congress has a full conviction of this necessity, they must, even upon principles purely national, have as firm an attachment to the one as to the other.  This conviction can never leave them, unless they become madmen.  While the constitution continues to be read, and its principle known, the States must, by every rational man, be considered as essential, component parts of The Union; and therefore the idea of sacrificing the former to the latter is wholly inadmissible.

The objectors do not advert to the natural strength and resources of State governments, which will ever give them an important superiority over the general government.  If we compare the nature of their different powers, or the means of popular influence which each possesses, we shall find the advantage entirely on the side of the States.  This consideration, important as it is, seems to have been little attended to.  The aggregate number of representatives throughout the States may be two thousand.  Their personal influence will, therefore, be proportionably more extensive than that of one or two hundred men in Congress.  The State establishments of civil and military officers of every description, infinitely surpassing in number any possible correspondent establishments in the general government, will create such an extent and complication of attachments, as will ever secure the predilection and support of the people.  Whenever, therefore, Congress shall meditate any infringement of the State constitutions, the great body of the people will naturally take part with their domestic representatives.  Can the general government withstand such an united opposition?  Will the people suffer themselves to be stripped of their privileges?  Will they suffer their Legislatures to be reduced to a shadow and a name?  The idea is shocking to common-sense.