Direct collision, therefore, between force and force, is the unavoidable result of that remedy for the revision of unconstitutional laws which the gentleman contends for.  It must happen in the very first case to which it is applied.  Is not this the plain result?  To resist by force the execution of a law, generally, is treason.  Can the courts of the United States take notice of the indulgence of a State to commit treason?  The common saying, that a State cannot commit treason herself, is nothing to the purpose.  Can she authorize others to do it?  If John Fries had produced an act of Pennsylvania, annulling the law of Congress, would it have helped his case?  Talk about it as we will, these doctrines go the length of revolution.  They are incompatible with any peaceable administration of the government.  They lead directly to disunion and civil commotion; and therefore it is, that at their commencement, when they are first found to be maintained by respectable men, and in a tangible form, I enter my public protest against them all.

The honorable gentleman argues that, if this Government be the sole judge of the extent of its own powers, whether that right of judging be in Congress or the Supreme Court, it equally subverts State sovereignty.  This the gentleman sees, or thinks he sees, although he cannot perceive how the right of judging, in this matter, if left to the exercise of State legislatures, has any tendency to subvert the government of the Union.  The gentleman’s opinion may be, that the right ought not to have been lodged with the General Government; he may like better such a Constitution as we should have had under the right of State interference; but I ask him to meet me on the plain matter of fact.  I ask him to meet me on the Constitution itself.  I ask him if the power is not found there, clearly and visibly found there?

But, sir, what is this danger, and what are the grounds of it?  Let it be remembered that the Constitution of the United States is not unalterable.  It is to continue in its present form no longer than the people who established it shall choose to continue it.  If they shall become convinced that they have made an injudicious or inexpedient partition and distribution of power between the State governments and the General Government, they can alter that distribution at will.

If any thing be found in the national Constitution, either by original provision or subsequent interpretation, which ought not to be in it, the people know how to get rid of it.  If any construction, unacceptable to them, be established so as to become practically a part of the Constitution, they will amend it, at their own sovereign pleasure.  But while the people choose to maintain it as it is, while they are satisfied with it, and refuse to change it, who has given, or who can give, to the legislatures a right to alter it, either by interference, construction, or otherwise?  Gentlemen do not seem to recollect that the people