Observe, sir, that this resolution holds the tariff of 1828, and every other tariff designed to promote one branch of industry at the expense of another, to be such a dangerous, palpable, and deliberate usurpation of power, as calls upon the States, in their sovereign capacity, to interfere by their own authority.  This denunciation, Mr. President, you will please to observe, includes our old tariff of 1816, as well as all others; because that was established to promote the interest of the manufacturers of cotton, to the manifest and admitted injury of the Calcutta cotton trade.  Observe, again, that all the qualifications are here rehearsed and charged upon the tariff, which are necessary to bring the case within the gentleman’s proposition.  The tariff is a usurpation; it is a dangerous usurpation; it is a palpable usurpation; it is a deliberate usurpation.  It is such a usurpation, therefore, as calls upon the States to exercise their right of interference.  Here is a case, then, within the gentleman’s principles, and all his qualifications of his principles.  It is a case for action.  The Constitution is plainly, dangerously, palpably, and deliberately violated; and the States must interpose their own authority to arrest the law.  Let us suppose the State of South Carolina to express the same opinion, by the voice of her Legislature.  That would be very imposing; but what then?  It so happens that, at the very moment, when South Carolina resolves that the tariff laws are unconstitutional, Pennsylvania and Kentucky resolve exactly the reverse.  They hold those laws to be both highly proper and strictly constitutional.  And now, sir, how does the honorable member propose to deal with this case?  How does he relieve us from this difficulty upon any principle of his?  His construction gets us into it; how does he propose to get us out?

In Carolina the tariff is a palpable, deliberate usurpation; Carolina, therefore, may nullify it, and refuse to pay the duties.  In Pennsylvania it is both clearly constitutional and highly expedient; and there the duties are to be paid.  And yet we live under a government of uniform laws, and under a constitution, too, which contains an express provision, as it happens, that all duties shall be equal in all States.  Does not this approach absurdity?

If there be no power to settle such questions, independent of either of the States, is not the whole Union a rope of sand?  Are we not thrown back again precisely upon the old Confederation?

It is too plain to be argued.  Four-and-twenty interpreters of constitutional law, each with a power to decide for itself, and none with authority to bind any body else, and this constitutional law the only bond of their union!  What is such a state of things but a mere connection during pleasure, or to use the phraseology of the times, during feeling?  And that feeling, too, not the feeling of the people, who established the Constitution, but the feeling of the State governments.