as political bodies, however sovereign, are yet not sovereign over the people.  So far as the people have given power to the General Government, so far the grant is unquestionably good, and the Government holds of the people, and not of the State governments.  We are all agents of the same supreme power, the people.  The General Government and the State governments derive their authority from the same source.  Neither can, in relation to the other, be called primary, though one is definite and restricted, and the other general and residuary.  The National Government possesses those powers which it can be shown the people have conferred on it, and no more.  All the rest belongs to the State governments, or to the people themselves.  So far as the people have restrained State sovereignty by the expression of their will, in the Constitution of the United States, so far, it must be admitted, State sovereignty is effectually controlled.  I do not contend that it is, or ought to be, controlled farther.  The sentiment to which I have referred propounds that State sovereignty is only to be controlled by its own “feeling of justice”—­that is to say, it is not to be controlled at all, for one who is to follow his own feelings is under no legal control.  Now, however men may think this ought to be, the fact is that the people of the United States have chosen to impose control on State sovereignties.  There are those, doubtless, who wish they had been left without restraint; but the Constitution has ordered the matter differently.  To make war, for instance, is an exercise of sovereignty; but the Constitution declares that no State shall make war.  To coin money is another exercise of sovereign power; but no State is at liberty to coin money.  Again, the Constitution says that no sovereign State shall be so sovereign as to make a treaty.  These prohibitions, it must be confessed, are a control on the State sovereignty of South Carolina, as well as of the other States, which does not arise “from her own feelings of honorable justice.”  The opinion referred to, therefore, is in defiance of the plainest provisions of the Constitution.

There are other proceedings of public bodies which have already been alluded to, and to which I refer again, for the purpose of ascertaining more fully what is the length and breadth of that doctrine denominated the Carolina doctrine, which the honorable member has now stood up on this floor to maintain.  In one of them I find it resolved, that “the tariff of 1828, and every other tariff designed to promote one branch of industry at the expense of others, is contrary to the meaning and intention of the federal compact, and such a dangerous, palpable, and deliberate usurpation of power, by a determined majority, wielding the General Government beyond the limits of its delegated powers, as calls upon the States which compose the suffering minority, in their sovereign capacity, to exercise the powers which, as sovereigns, necessarily devolve upon them when their contract is violated.”