“It was in the midst of summer, in the year 1740, that this squadron was formed at Portsmouth, at the same time that a great embarkation was preparing for the West Indies, by which the siege of Carthagena was afterwards undertaken, which turned the eyes of the whole world upon that sea-port.  At London, every person spoke of the intended expedition to the South Seas as a design that must necessarily be attended with highly advantageous consequences, if properly conducted; and of this there was not made the least doubt, when it was known that Captain Anson was named to the command, because he had shewn himself upon all occasions equally vigilant in his duty, and moderate in the exercise of power, more ready to correct by his own example than by any other sort of reproof, and who, in the course of his services, had acquired the respect of the officers, and the love of the sailors; qualities that rarely meet in one person, and qualities which, without the least contradiction, were ascribed to him.[2]

[Footnote 2:  The sequel of these observations, by Harris, are extracted from his supplementary reflections at the close of the expedition, vol. 1, p. 364, et sequ. In these, however, we have used much retrenchment, as the observations that may have been exceedingly applicable in 1745, when Spain was in a great manner identified with France, have now lost much of their force, in consequence of the passing events, well known to all, but which do not admit of being discussed in a note.—­E.]

“Though this expedition was not attended by so great success in the South Seas as was expected, yet the nation in general was far from believing that its comparative failure ought to deter us from the thoughts of such expeditions for the future, since it plainly appeared, that, if the whole squadron had got round along with the commodore into the South Seas, he would have been able to have performed much greater things than any of our commanders had hitherto done in these parts.  Neither is it at all clear that the Spaniards are there in a better condition, their coasts better fortified, their garrisons more numerous, or the country in any respect better provided, than when our privateers had formerly so great success in those parts.  The sacking of Payta in this expedition proves the contrary, since it was then actually in a worse condition, and less capable of making any resistance, than when formerly taken by Captain Shelvocke.  If this expedition had never taken place, we might have been told that it was impracticable, that the Spaniards were grown wiser, that all their ports were well fortified, and any attempt of this kind would be only to sacrifice the lives of such as might be employed in the expedition.  But we now know the contrary, and that the Spaniards remained as unguarded, and as little apprehensive as ever; perhaps even the fate of this expedition may have made them less so, insomuch, that were a new project of the same kind