Hence, he said, the corpus delicti is wanting.  But suppose the words were as testified by some, though they are contradicted by others, “damned abominable,” what then?  Was that reviling or profane speaking?  The words were two.  Now, no one would pretend that “abominable” was profane language.  “The idea is abominable,” said Tippit, “and I hope brother Ketchum won’t take me up for saying that.  What does the other word mean?” Hereupon the counsel referred to a dictionary, to which also we refer our readers.  “There you see,” said he, “there is no harm in it.  At most, the word can in its present application, be considered only as an intensitive, or the like.  The fact is, may it please the court, it is but a strong form of expression, and means no more nor less than very, and I should be willing to leave it to the good sense of those who hear me, as to a jury, to say if my construction is not correct.”

Here Tom Gladding nodded his head at Tippit.

“Mr. Gladding,” continued Tippit, “nods his head, and I honor his judgment, and venture to say there is not a man here better qualified to speak on the subject.”

Here there was a general laugh at Tom’s expense, in which the court itself joined.  Tom, appearing to regard the joke very little, and only saying, “The squire’s got it right by chance this time, I guess.”  Presently, the court commanded silence, and Mr. Tippit proceeded.

“I flatter myself,” he added, “that I have satisfied your honor there is no profane language in the case; and that ought to be sufficient for my purpose, even though the court should be of opinion that the prisoner was guilty of reviling; because the words of the statute are in the conjunctive, providing punishment only where profane speaking and reviling are united, being levelled, not at one alone, but at both as one act.  It should also be borne in mind, that the statute is penal, and for that reason must be construed, strictly, in favor of liberty.  But I will now proceed to inquire whether there has been any reviling in the sense of the statute.  Who was intended to be protected against injurious language?  Reasonable beings only, certainly.  Assuredly not the delicate feelings of horses, or cows, or pigs, and if so, much less those of an inanimate object, like a book.  Now, it will be recollected that the language uttered characterized the contents of a book, not Mr. Davenport.  The words were consistent with the supposition that the prisoner cherished the highest respect for him, whatever his opinion might be of the sermon.  It was then absurd to pursue a man criminally for criticising a book, and requesting another not to read it, which was all that had been done.”

Here Ketchum inquired how his brother Tippit would get over the words, “man of sin,” which it was testified had been applied by the prisoner to Davenport.