from the remainder of the witnesses.  In this he was partially successful, each one intending most sincerely to tell the truth, and yet artfully led on by the lawyer, often falsely coloring and distorting the facts.  On the conclusion of the testimony on the part of the State, Mr. Tippit produced witnesses to prove the words spoken, who, after all, did not alter the complexion of things, and also the good character of the prisoner, but this latter proposal was stoutly opposed by Ketchum, as irrelevant to the issue.

“What have we to do,” said he, “with the character of the prisoner?  His character is not at issue.  That may be as good as the Court’s, for instance (and I desire no higher), and yet the offence charged may have been committed.  If brother Tippit is allowed to run into all these side issues, we shall never be done with the examination, and therefore I object to the testimony.”

Tippit, in reply, expressed great surprise at the conduct of his brother, Ketchum; “but,” said he, “I do not wonder at the anxiety of the gentleman to keep out testimony of so vast importance for my client.  Here is a discrepancy.  Some witnesses state the language said to have been used by my client in one way, some in another.  Now, although a man of good character might use the words ’soul damning and abominable,’ which we are constantly hearing in sermons and prayers, and if they are proper there, one might suppose them proper in common discourse, he would be less likely to use the other phrase; though, if he did, I hope I shall be able to convince the court there’s no great harm in that.”

Here Ketchum’s face expressed unutterable astonishment, and the Justice, as if scandalized at the proposition, interrupted the counsel, and told him he hoped he did not mean to justify profane language.

“Far from it, please your honor,” answered Tippit, “but I say we have been guilty of no profanity which, at the proper time, I expect to satisfy the court of.  We offer the testimony now for two purposes:  first, to assist the judgment of the court in coming to a conclusion, whether the words were spoken or not, because if we prove the prisoner’s good character, it is less likely they were uttered by him; and secondly, if your honor should be of opinion that the words were used, in mitigation of punishment, if, indeed, the court should be disposed to take notice at all of the trifle of which the prisoner stands accused.”

Ketchum reiterated his objections, denying that the testimony was admissible for either purpose.  He did not think, he said, that his brother Tippit was able to assist the judgment of the court a great deal; as for judgment, the article was so scarce with a certain gentleman, he advised him to keep the modicum he had for his own use.  So far as mitigation of punishment was concerned, he thought the greater the respectability of the offender, the greater should be the punishment, both because his education and opportunities should have taught him better, and by way of example to others, in like case to offend.  The doctrine of the gentleman, he added, might do well enough where kings and aristocrats ground the people to powder, but he hoped never to see the day, when, in our own free country, a man might do what he pleased because he was respectable.