I should be sorry if by any observations, such as the preceding, I should be thought to censure any one for the morality of his feelings.  And still more sorry should I be, if I were to be thought to have any intention of derogating from the character of the Supreme Being.  I am far from denying his omniscience, for I believe that he sees every sparrow that falls to the ground, and even more, that he knows the innermost thoughts of men.  I deny not his omnipresence, for I believe that he may be seen in all his works.  I deny neither his general nor his particular providence, nor his hearing of our prayers, nor his right direction in our spiritual concerns, nor his making of all things work together for good to those who love him.  Neither do I refuse to admit him either into our journies, or into our walks, or into our chambers, for he can make all the things we see subservient to our moral instruction, and his own glory.  But I should be sorry to have him considered as a clock, that is to inform us about the times of our ordinary movements, or to make him a prompter in all our worldly concerns, or to oblige him to take his seat in animal magnetism, or to reside in the midst marvellous delusions.  Why should we expect a revelation in the most trivial concerns of our lives, where our reason will inform us?  Why, like the waggoner, apply to Jupiter, when we may remove the difficulty by putting our own shoulders to the wheels?  If we are reasonable creatures, we can generally tell, whether we ought to go forwards or backwards, or to begin, or to postpone, whether our actions are likely to be innocent or hurtful, or whether we are going on an errand of benevolence or of evil.  In fact, there can be no necessity for this constant appeal to the Spirit in all our worldly concerns, while we possess our reason as men.  And unless some distinction be made between the real agency of God and our own volitions, which distinction true Quakerism suggests, we shall be liable to be tossed to and fro by every wind that blows, and to become the creatures of a superstition, that may lead us into great public evils, while it may be injurious to our health and intellect, and to the happiness and utility of our lives.

CHAP.  XII.

Morally defective traits—­First of these is that of obstinacy—­This was attached also to the early Christians—­No just foundation for the existence of this trait.

I come now to the consideration of those which I have denominated morally defective traits.

The first trait of this kind, which is attached to the character of the Quakers, is that of an obstinate spirit.

This trait is a very ancient one.  It was observed in the time of George Fox, of the members of this society, that they were as “stiff as trees,” and this idea concerning them has come down to the present day.