For these and other reasons they choose not to submit to the custom, but to bear their testimony against it, and to run the hazard of having their windows broken, or their houses pillaged, as the populace may dictate:  And in the same manner, if there be any other practice, in which the world may expect them to coincide, they reject it, fearless of the consequences, if they believe it to be productive of evil.

This noble practice of bearing testimony, by which a few individuals attempt to stem the torrent of immorality by opposing themselves to its stream, and which may be considered as a living martyrdom, does, in a moral point of view, a great deal of good to those, who conscientiously adopt it.  It recalls first principles to their minds.  It keeps in their remembrance the religious rights of man.  It teaches them to reason upon principle, and to make their estimates by a moral standard.  It is productive both of patience and of courage.  It occasions them to be kind and attentive, and merciful to those who are persecuted and oppressed.  It throws them into the presence of the Divinity when they are persecuted themselves.  In short, it warms their moral feelings, and elevates their religious thoughts.  Like oil, it keeps them from rusting.  Like a whetstone, it gives them a new edge.  Take away this practice from the constitution of the Quakers, and you pull down a considerable support of their moral character.  It is a great pity that, as professing Christians, we should not, more of us, incorporate this noble principle individually into our religion.  We concur unquestionably in customs, through the fear of being reputed singular, of which our hearts do not always approve, though nothing is more true, than that a Christian is expected to be singular with respect to the corruptions of the world.  What an immensity of good would be done, if cases of persons, choosing rather to suffer than to temporize, were so numerous as to attract the general notice of men!  Would not every case of suffering operate as one of the most forcible lessons that could be given to those who should see it?  And how long would that infamous system have to live, which makes a distinction between political expediency and moral right?

CHAP.  VI.

A fourth trait is, that, in political affairs, they reason upon principle, and not from consequences—­This mode of reasoning insures the adoption of the maxim of not doing evil that good may come—­Had Quakers been legislators, many public evils had been avoided, which are now known in the world—­Existence of this trait probable from the influence of the former trait—­and from the influence of the peculiar customs of the Quakers—­and from the influence of their system of discipline upon their minds.

The next trait, which I shall lay open to the world as belonging to the Quaker character, is, that in all those cases, which may be called political, the Quakers generally reason upon principle, and but seldom upon consequences.