It is an old saying among the Quaker writers, that “truth was before all oaths.”  By this they mean, there was a time, when men’s words were received as truths, without the intervention of an oath.  Ancient fable, indeed, tells us, that there were no oaths in the golden age, but that, when men departed from their primitive simplicity, and began to quarrel with one another, they had recourse to falsehood to substantiate their own case, after which it became necessary, that some expedient should be devised, in the case of disputes, for the ascertaining the truth.  Hence Hesiod makes the god of oaths the son of Esis or of contention.  This, account differs but little from that of Polybuis, who says, that the use of oaths in judgment was rare among the ancients, but that, as perfidy grew, oaths increased.

And as it is a saying of the Quakers, that “truth was before all oaths,” so they believe, that truth would be spoken, if oaths were done away.  Thus, that which is called honour by the world, will bind men to the truth, who perhaps know but little of religion.  But if so, then he, who makes Christianity his guide, will not be found knowingly in a falsehood, though he be deprived of the opportunity of swearing.

But if it be true, that truth existed before the invention of oaths, and that truth would still be spoken, even if all oaths were abolished, then the Quakers say, that oaths are not so necessary as some have imagined, because they have but a secondary effect in the production of the truth.  This conclusion they consider also as the result of reason.  For good men will speak truth without an oath, and bad men will hardly be influenced by one.  And where oaths are regarded, it is probable that truth is forced out of men, not so much, because they consider them as solemn appeals to God, as that they consider the penalties, which will follow their violation; so that a simple affirmation, under the same pains and penalties, would be equally productive of the truth.

The Quakers consider oaths again as very injurious to morality.  For first, they conceive it to be great presumption in men to summon God as a witness in their trilling and earthly concerns.

They believe, secondly, that, if men accustom themselves to call upon God on civil occasions, they render his name so familiar to them, that they are likely to lose the reverence due to it, or so to blend religious with secular considerations, that they become in danger of losing sight of the dignity, solemnity, and awfulness of devotion.  And it is not an unusual remark, that persons, most accustomed to oaths, are the most likely to perjury.  A custom-house oath has become proverbial in our own country.  I do not mean by this to accuse mercantile men in particular, but to state it as a received opinion, that, where men make solemn things familiar, there is a danger of their moral degradation.  Hence the Quakers consider the common administration of oaths to have a tendency that is injurious to the moral interests of men.