Another general argument is, that learning is apt to lead to conceit and pride, or to a presumed superiority of intellect, in consequence of which men raise themselves in their own estimation, and look down upon others as creatures of an inferior order of race.  To this I may answer, that as prodigies are daily produced in nature, though they may be but as one to a hundred thousand when compared with the perfect things of their own kind, so such phenomena may occasionally make their appearance in the world.  But as far as my own experience goes, I believe the true tendency of learning to be quite the reverse.  I believe the most learned to be generally the most humble, and to be the most sensible of their own ignorance.  Men, in the course of their studies, daily find something new.  Every thing new shews them only their former ignorance, and how much there is yet to learn.  The more they persevere, in their researches, the more they acknowledge the latter fact.  The longer they live, the more they lament the shortness of life, during which, man with all his industry, can attain so little, and that, when he is but just beginning to know, he is cut off.  They see, in short, their own nothingness, and, however they may be superior in their attainments, they are convinced that their knowledge is, after all, but a shadow; that it is but darkness; that it is but the absence of light; and that it no sooner begins to assume an appearance than it is gone.

The last general argument against learning is, that it does not lead to morality, or that learned men do not always exhibit an example of the best character.  In answer to this I must observe, that the natural tendency of learning is to virtue.  If learned men are not virtuous, I presume their conduct is an exception to the general effect of knowledge upon the mind.  That there are, however, persons of such unnatural character, I must confess.  But any deficiency in their example is not to be attributed to their learning.  It is to be set down, on the other hand, to the morally defective education they have received.  They have not been accustomed to wise restraints.  More pains have been taken to give them knowledge, than to instruct them in religion.  But where an education has been bestowed upon persons, in which their morals have been duly attended to, where has knowledge been found to be at variance, or rather where has it not been found to be in union, with virtue?  Of this union the Quakers can trace some of the brightest examples in their own society.  Where did knowledge, for instance, separate herself from religion in Barclay, or in Penn, or in Burroughs, or in Pennington, or in Ellwood, or in Arscott, or in Claridge, or in many others who might be named.  And as this has been the case in the Quaker society, where a due care has been taken of morals, so it has been the case where a similar care has been manifested in the great society of the world.