times of danger, they would by custom become careless with respect to themselves, and that ultimately some mischief would befal them.  It is knowledge, then, acquired by a due exercise of the intellectual powers, and through the course of an enlightened education, which will give men just views of the causes and effects of things, and which, while it teaches them to discover and acknowledge the Divine Being in all his wondrous works, and properly to distinguish him in his providences, preserves them from the miseries of superstition.

The world again has fixed the moral blemish of the money-getting, spirit upon the Quaker character.  But knowledge would step in here also as a considerable corrector of the evil.  It would shew, that there were other objects besides money, which were worthy of pursuit.  Nor would it point out only new objects, but it would make a scale of their comparative importance.  It would fix intellectual attachments, next to religion, in the highest class.  Thus money would sink in importance as a pursuit, or be valued only as it was the means of comfort to those who had it, or of communicating comfort to others.  Knowledge also would be useful in taking off, to a certain degree, the corruptive effects of this spirit, for it would prevent it by the more liberal notions it would introduce, from leaving the whole of its dregs of pollution upon the mind.

The Quakers again, as we have seen, have been charged with a want of animation, from whence an unjust inference has been drawn of the coldness of their hearts.  But knowledge would diminish this appearance.  For, in the first place, it would enlarge the powers, and vary the topics of conversation.  It would enliven the speaker.  It would give him animation in discourse.  Animation again would produce a greater appearance of energy, and energy of the warmth of life.  And there are few people, whatever might be the outward cold appearance of the person with whom they conversed, whose prejudices would not die away, if they found a cheerful and an agreeable companion.

Another charge against the Quakers was obstinacy.  This was shewn to be unjust.  The trait, in this case, should rather have been put down as virtue.  Knowledge, however, would even operate here as a partial remedy.  For while the Quakers are esteemed deficient in literature, their opposition to the customs of the world, will always be characterized as folly.  But if they were to bear in the minds of their countrymen a different estimation as to intellectual attainments, the trait might be spoken of under another name.  For persons are not apt to impute obstinacy to the actions of those, however singular, whom they believe to have paid a due attention to the cultivation of their minds.

It is not necessary to bring to recollection the other traits that were mentioned, to see the operation of a superior education upon these.  It must have already appeared, that, whatever may be the general advantages of learning, they would be more than usually valuable to the Quaker character.