I must observe then, that the philosophical moralists had the advantage of the Quakers in this controversy, inasmuch as they supposed that knowledge was a better safeguard to morals than a mere ignorance of vice; but they failed in this, that they permitted this knowledge to be acquired by passing through scenes which might not be friendly to virtue.  Now this latter permission is inadmissible in a Christian education; for no Christian youth ought to be permitted to see or to hear that which ought not to be uttered or exhibited by a Christian.  The Quakers, on the other hand, had the advantage of the philosophical moralists, inasmuch as they considered ignorance to be better than corrupted knowledge; but they failed in this, that they seemed to rely upon ignorance of vice as a safeguard against it, without a proper portion of knowledge.  The education then, to which I allude, ought to embrace the most valuable positions of both.  It should consist of knowledge, and it should consist of wise prohibitions also.  Knowledge and prohibitions are inseparable.  While the mind is gaining knowledge, it should be kept innocent.  And while it is kept innocent, it should be gaining knowledge.  Youth should have that kind of knowledge instilled into them, by which they should discern the value of the prohibitions which are enjoined them.  They should have such and so much knowledge, that if they were accidentally placed in the way of the things prohibited, they should be able to look them in the face, and pass through them without injury.  This is that education, which, without superseding the necessity of the influence of the Holy Spirit, has a tendency to enable persons, while they live in the world, to live out of it or deny it.

But lest I should not be clearly understood upon this subject, I will exemplify how such an education would act or operate to the end proposed.

And, first of all, knowledge may be acquired by reading.  Now there are two kinds of reading, the one useful, the other dangerous.  By the premises, I am to adopt the first, and to prohibit the last.  If then I accustom my child to the best and purest models of ancient and modern literature, I give him a certain taste for composition.  If I accustom him to the purest and most amiable sentiments, as contained in these, I give him a love of virtue.  If I heighten these sentiments by beautiful selections from the more pure and amiable sentiments of Christianity, I increase that love.  If I give him in my own conduct an example, he sees me practise that which I recommend.  I give him then a taste for the purest reading, and the choicest compositions, and I offer to his notice, at the same time, a certain system of morality, which he cannot but gradually adopt as his own.  Now I would ask, what influence could a novel have upon a mind formed in this manner, if thrown accidentally in his way.  If its composition were but moderate, as is the case with most of them, it would not suit the taste of my child.  If its sentiments were impure, it would disgust him.  These would be so contrary to the taste and to the feelings he had acquired, that the poison in such a book, like a ball, fired at a globular surface, would slide off without detriment to the morals of my child.