Others again, who cannot obtain these honourable distractions, envy those who possess them.  They envy the very coronet upon the coach, as it passes by.  But the Quakers can have no such feelings as these.  They pass in their pilgrimage through life regardless of such distinctions, or they estimate them but as the baubles of the, day.  It would be folly therefore to suppose, that they could be envious of that which they do not covet.

The Quakers again are exempt from some of the occasions of uneasiness which arise to others from considerations on the subject of religion.  Some people, for example, pry into what are denominated mysteries.  The more they look into these, the less they understand them, or rather, the more they are perplexed and confounded.  Such an enquiry too, while it bewilders the understanding, generally affects the mind.  But the Quakers avoid all such curious enquiries as these, and therefore they suffer no interruption of their enjoyment from this source.  Others again, by the adoption of gloomy creeds, give rise frequently to melancholy, and thus lay in for themselves a store of fuel for the torment of their own minds.  But the Quakers espouse no doctrines, which, while they conduct themselves uprightly, can interrupt the tranquillity of their lives.  It is possible there may be here and mere an instance where their feelings may be unduly affected, in consequence of having carried the doctrine of the influence of the Spirit, as far as it relates to their own condition, beyond its proper bounds.  But individuals, who may fell into errors of this nature, are, it is to be hoped, but few; because any melancholy, which may arise from these causes, must be the effect, not of genuine Quakerism, but of a degenerate superstition.

CHAP.  II.

Good, which the Quakers have done as a society upon earth—­by their general good example—­by shewing that persecution for religion is ineffectual—­by shewing the practicability of the subjugation of the will of man—­the influence of Christianity on character—­the inefficacy of capital punishments—­the best object of punishment—­the practicability of living, either in a private or a public capacity, in harmony and peace—­the superiority of the policy of the Gospel over the policy of the world.

When we consider man as distinguished from other animals by the rational and spiritual faculties which he possesses, we cannot but conceive it to be a reproach to his nature, if he does not distinguish himself from these, or, if he does not leave some trace behind him, that he has existed rationally and profitably both to himself and others.  But if this be expected of man, considered abstractedly as man, much more will it be expected of him, if he has had the advantages of knowing the doctrines of Christianity, and the sublime example of the great Author of that religion.  And the same observation, I apprehend, will hold true with respect to societies of men.  For if they have done no good during their existence, we cannot see how they can escape censure, or that it would not have been better that they had not existed at all.  This consideration leads me to enquire, what good the Quakers have done since their institution, as a society, upon earth.