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Now, what man among them, professes to have seen this woman for twenty-one years?  Not one.  The learned gentleman attempts to sustain his case, because one of our witnesses, certainly not more than one, has not seen this woman for about the same length of time:  but don’t you perceive, that in this case they all lived in the same State, if not in the same county—­they had intercourse with persons mutually acquainted with her, and three out of four of them, met her for several months at the same church; and one witness, who had long been in her society, and in close association with her, knew she had a mark upon her forehead corresponding to the one she bore on her own.  And by dint of all these matters, this long continued acquaintance only reviving the impressions received in early life, they had no doubt of the identity of the person.  Was there ever a more perfect train of evidence exhibited to prove the identity of a person, than on the present occasion?

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We have called witnesses on this point alone, and have more than counterpoised the evidence produced upon the opposite side.  And we have not only made it manifest that she was a free woman, but we have confirmed her charter by separate proof.  What does the gentleman say further?  Do I understand him to say we have no right to determine this matter judicially?  Now what is all this about?  Why is it before you, taking your time day after day?  According to this argument, you have nothing to do but to give the master the flesh he claims.  But you are to be satisfied that you have sufficient reason to believe that these claims are well founded.  And if you leave that matter in a state of doubt, it does not require a single witness to be called on the part of the respondent, to prove on the opposite side of the question.  But we have come in with a weight of evidence demolishing the structure he has raised, restoring the woman to her original position in the estimation of the law.  “Well,” says the gentleman, “it is like the case of a fugitive from justice.”  But it is not, and if it were, it would not benefit his case.  The case of a fugitive from justice is one in which the prisoner is remanded to the custody of the law, handed over for legal purposes.  The case of a fugitive from labor is a case in which the individual is handed over sometimes to a merciless master, and very rarely to a charitable one.  Does the counsel mean to say that in the case of a fugitive from justice he is not bound to satisfy the judge before whom, the question is heard?  He should prove our witnesses unworthy of belief.  As Judge Grier said, upon a former occasion, “You can choose your own time; you have full and abundant opportunities on every side to prepare against any contingency.”  Why don’t they do so?  He is not to come here and force on a case, and say, I suppose you take every thing for granted.  He is to come prepared to prove the justice of his claim before the tribunal who is to decide upon it.  That he has not done successfully, and I would, therefore, ask your Honor, after the elaborate argument on the part of the plaintiff, to discharge this woman:  for after such an abundance of testimony unbroken and incontestable as that we have exhibited here, it would be a monstrous perversion of reason to suppose that anything more could be required.