June 15, 1838.

Real cause of our interference in Spain.

The system of interference adopted by his late majesty’s government, by means of the quadruple treaty, was with a view to the contest between extreme opinions—­it was more with a view of aiding these extreme opinions, than to the arrangement of the mere differences between Don Carlos, upon the one side, and the queen, or her daughter, upon the other; to support certain opinions, and not to determine the succession, was the cause of interference.  I regret interference upon that ground; I object to interference upon that ground; and I say, moreover, that we were not right in interfering upon that ground.  I maintain that, more particularly on account of the extreme opinions that prevailed, we ought not to have interfered at all; but most especially we ought not, according to the common practice of this government, and in accordance with the declared political principles of the noble lords themselves, to have interfered in a question involving extreme political opinions.  Now it has unfortunately happened that extreme political principles have been forced upon a great part of Europe by means of large armies and of great military forces, and it was consequently expected that the same thing would succeed in Spain.  This, I believe, was the object of our interference with Spain, and not to determine the Spanish succession.

June 19, 1838.

We had no right to interfere against Don Carlos.

I say we had no business to interfere in the question of succession.  There might have been some pretext for interference in the question of succession, if any of the powers of Europe had taken part with Don Carlos, but that was not the case.  The noble baron (Lord Holland) cheers.  I say, confidently, that not one of the powers in Europe had stirred a finger in support of the pretensions of Don Carlos.  I say, then, that, according to all principles—­the principles supported and acted upon by this country, in the case of the house of Braganza, and many other cases that I could mention—­we ought to have avoided interference; and we ought to have avoided interference by armies more particularly, in the contests in Spain.  I say, my lords, that not a sword had been moved in Europe in favour of Don Carlos.  When Don Carlos went to Spain, in the summer of 1834, there were not three battalions in arms in that country in his favour.  This I positively state as a fact.  But, on the contrary, in the space of forty leagues there were forty fortified posts in possession of the queen’s troops.  Now, my lords, this is a positive fact; and I say that, in the year 1835, when the armistice was negotiated, when the exchange of prisoners was negotiated by Lord Eliot, Don Carlos had then acquired a superiority over the queen’s forces, who were obliged to take up a position on the right of the Ebro.  That is to say, between the interval of time I have mentioned,—­and this