there can be any communication between these three, except by the French frontier, and by sea from Socoa, or by the Ebro.  An arrangement is made for an attack, and a day named.  What was the consequence?  General Evans made an attack, but General Saarsfield, at Pampeluna, does not attack; there is a frost or snow, or rain, or some physical impediment which prevents a movement on the part of Saarsfield.  General Evans cannot be informed in time, and the enemy has opportunity and leisure to throw his whole force upon General Evans; who, even if the troops had behaved well, would have been compelled to retire.  The position, therefore, of the legion at St. Sebastian, in order to co-operate with the British squadron, that there might be something like British co-operation, was not an operation of war, it was one of stock-jobbing.  My lords, it is a matter of much surprise to me, that General Evans, who, having acquired the confidence of his majesty’s government, and that of the Queen of Spain, I presume must be an able man—­it is, certainly, a surprising circumstance, that having had experience of the difficulties of carrying on communication in that country, and having met with a check in the month of January, 1836, for want of communication, he should not have felt the danger of his position, and should have omitted to put himself in communication to a certainty with corps in whose co-operation he was to act, instead of keeping himself at a distance, in order that he might carry on operations in concert with his majesty’s fleet.

April 21,1837.

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Undisciplined state of the Legion.

The noble lord has stated that he will not recall the marines.  I would beg to remind your lordships, and the noble viscount in particular, of this fact—­that the marines are properly the garrisons of his majesty’s ships, and that upon no pretence ought they to be moved from a fair and safe communication with the ships to which they belong.  The noble lord states, that he is responsible, and that he will take upon himself the responsibility.  I have commanded his majesty’s armies, and have incurred as many risks, and faced more difficulties than, I hope, the noble lord will ever have to encounter.  I have been engaged in hostilities of this description, where co-operation was carried on upon the coast; and though I certainly would do as much for the service, and I believe I may say, have done as much for the service, as the noble lord, yet I would not venture, and have never ventured, to put any corps whatever in co-operation with the Spaniards, or in any situation whatever in which the detached troops could not communicate with the corps from which they were detached; and, above all, upon the sea-coast, where the troops detached could not hold communication with the ships.  The first order to each of these detachments was, to keep the communication with their ships.  The loss of 400 or 500 marines may not materially involve the