The Constitution makes the jury, in a criminal case, the judges of the law and of the facts.  No matter how clear or how strong the case may appear to the judge, it must be submitted to the jury.  That is the mandate of the Constitution.  As no one can be convicted of crime except upon trial by jury, it follows that the jury are entitled to pass upon the law as well as the facts.  The judge can advise the jury on questions of law.  He can legally do no more.  If he control the jury and direct a verdict of guilty, he himself is guilty of a crime for which impeachment is the remedy.

The jury in Miss Anthony’s case was composed of excellent men.  None better could have been drawn anywhere.  Justice Hunt knew that.  He had the jury impanelled only as a matter of form.  He said so in the inspectors’ case.  He came to Canandaigua to hold the Circuit Court, for the purpose of convicting Miss Anthony.  He had unquestionably prepared his opinion beforehand.  The job had to be done, so he took the bull by the horns and directed the jury to find a verdict of guilty.  In the case of the inspectors he refused to defendants’ counsel the right of addressing the jury.

Judge Hunt very adroitly, in passing sentence on Miss Anthony imposing a fine of $100, refused to add, what is usual in such cases, that she be imprisoned until the fine be paid.  Had he done so, Miss Anthony would have gone to prison, and then taken her case directly to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of habeas corpus.  There she would have been discharged, because trial by jury had been denied her.  But as Miss Anthony was not even held in custody after judgment had been pronounced, she could not resort to habeas corpus proceedings and had no appeal.

    But the outrage of ordering a verdict of guilty against the
    defendant was not the only outrage committed by this judge on these
    trials: 

It was an outrage to refuse the right of a defendant to poll the jury.

    It was an outrage for the judge to refuse to hold that if the
    defendant believed she had a right to vote, and voted in good faith
    in that belief, she was not guilty of the charge.

It was an outrage to hold that the jury, in considering the question whether she did or did not believe she had a right to vote, might not consider that she took the advice of Judge Selden before she voted, and acted on that advice.

It was an outrage to hold that the jury might not take into consideration, as bearing upon the same question, the fact that the inspectors and supervisor of election looked into the question, and came to the conclusion that she had the right to be registered and vote, and told her so, and so decided.

    It was an outrage for the judge to hold that the jury had not the
    right to consider the defendant’s motive, and to find her innocent
    if she acted without any intent to violate the law.