On the principle of reformation of their own House, connected with a principle of public economy, an act passed for rendering contractors with government incapable of a seat in Parliament.  The India Bill (unfortunately lost in the House of Lords) pursued the same idea to its completion, and disabled all servants of the East India Company from a seat in that House for a certain time, and until their conduct was examined into and cleared.  The remedy of infinite corruptions and of infinite disorders and oppressions, as well as the security of the most important objects of public economy, perished with that bill and that Parliament.  That Parliament also instituted a committee to inquire into the collection of the revenue in all its branches, which prosecuted its duty with great vigor, and suggested several material improvements.

[62] If these speculations are let loose, the House of Lords may quarrel with their share of the legislature, as being limited with regard to the origination of grants to the crown and the origination of money bills.  The advisers of the crown may think proper to bring its negative into ordinary use,—­and even to dispute, whether a mere negative, compared with the deliberative power exercised in the other Houses, be such a share in the legislature as to produce a due balance in favor of that branch, and thus justify the previous interference of the crown in the manner lately used.  The following will serve to show how much foundation there is for great caution concerning these novel speculations.  Lord Shelburne, in his celebrated speech, April 8th, 1778, expresses himself as follows. (Vide Parliamentary Register, Vol.  X.)

“The noble and learned lord on the woolsack, in the debate which opened the business of this day, asserted that your Lordships were incompetent to make any alteration in a money bill or a bill of supply, I should be glad to see the matter fairly and fully discussed, and the subject brought forward and argued upon precedent, as well as all its collateral relations.  I should be pleased to see the question fairly committed, were it for no other reason but to hear the sleek, smooth contractors from the other House come to this bar and declare, that they, and they only, could frame a money bill, and they, and they only, could dispose of the property of the peers of Great Britain.  Perhaps some arguments more plausible than those I heard this day from the woolsack, to show that the Commons have an uncontrollable, unqualified right to bind your Lordships’ property, may be urged by them.  At present, I beg leave to differ from the noble and learned lord; for, until the claim, after a solemn discussion of this House, is openly and directly relinquished, I shall continue to be of opinion that your Lordships have a right to after, amend, or reject a money bill.”

The Duke of Richmond also, in his letter to the volunteers of Ireland, speaks of several of the powers exercised by the House of Commons in the light of usurpations; and his Grace is of opinion, that, when the people are restored to what he conceives to be their rights, in electing the House of Commons, the other branches of the legislature ought to be restored to theirs.—­Vide Remembrancer, Vol.  XVI.