whom hold for this very term of four years?  Did it not lie against the Governor-General and Council named in the act of 1773,—­who were invested by name, as the present commissioners are to be appointed in the body of the act of Parliament, who were to hold their places for a term of years, and were not removable at the discretion of the crown?  Did it not lie against the reappointment, in the year 1780, upon the very same terms?  Yet at none of these times, whatever other objections the scheme might be liable to, was it supposed to be a derogation to the just prerogative of the crown, that a commission created by act of Parliament should have its members named by the authority which called it into existence.  This is not the disposal by Parliament of any office derived from the authority of the crown, or now disposable by that authority.  It is so far from being anything new, violent, or alarming, that I do not recollect, in any Parliamentary commission, down to the commissioners of the land-tax, that it has ever been otherwise.

The objection of the tenure for four years is an objection to all places that are not held during pleasure; but in that objection I pronounce the gentlemen, from my knowledge of their complexion and of their principles, to be perfectly in earnest.  The party (say these gentlemen) of the minister who proposes this scheme will be rendered powerful by it; for he will name his party friends to the commission.  This objection against party is a party objection; and in this, too, these gentlemen are perfectly serious.  They see, that, if, by any intrigue, they should succeed to office, they will lose the clandestine patronage, the true instrument of clandestine influence, enjoyed in the name of subservient Directors, and of wealthy, trembling Indian delinquents.  But as often as they are beaten off this ground, they return to it again.  The minister will name his friends, and persons of his own party.  Whom should he name?  Should he name his adversaries?  Should he name those whom he cannot trust?  Should he name those to execute his plans who are the declared enemies to the principles of his reform?  His character is here at stake.  If he proposes for his own ends (but he never will propose) such names as, from their want of rank, fortune, character, ability, or knowledge, are likely to betray or to fall short of their trust, he is in an independent House of Commons,—­in an House of Commons which has, by its own virtue, destroyed the instruments of Parliamentary subservience.  This House of Commons would not endure the sound of such names.  He would perish by the means which he is supposed to pursue for the security of his power.  The first pledge he must give of his sincerity in this great reform will be in the confidence which ought to be reposed in those names.