If the government of India wants no reformation, but gentlemen are amusing themselves with a theory, conceiving a more democratic or aristocratic mode of government for these dependencies, or if they are in a dispute only about patronage, the dispute is with me of so little concern that I should not take the pains to utter an affirmative or negative to any proposition in it.  If it be only for a theoretical amusement that they are to propose a bill, the thing is at best frivolous and unnecessary.  But if the Company’s government is not only full of abuse, but is one of the most corrupt and destructive tyrannies that probably ever existed in the world, (as I am sure it is,) what a cruel mockery would it be in me, and in those who think like me, to propose this kind of remedy for this kind of evil!

I now come to the third objection,—­that this bill will increase the influence of the crown.  An honorable gentleman has demanded of me, whether I was in earnest when I proposed to this House a plan for the reduction of that influence.  Indeed, Sir, I was much, very much, in earnest My heart was deeply concerned in it; and I hope the public has not lost the effect of it.  How far my judgment was right, for what concerned personal favor and consequence to myself, I shall not presume to determine; nor is its effect upon me, of any moment.  But as to this bill, whether it increases the influence of the crown, or not, is a question I should be ashamed to ask.  If I am not able to correct a system of oppression and tyranny, that goes to the utter ruin of thirty millions of my fellow-creatures and fellow-subjects, but by some increase to the influence of the crown, I am ready here to declare that I, who have been active to reduce it, shall be at least as active and strenuous to restore it again.  I am no lover of names; I contend for the substance of good and protecting government, let it come from what quarter it will.

But I am not obliged to have recourse to this expedient.  Much, very much, the contrary.  I am sure that the influence of the crown will by no means aid a reformation of this kind, which can neither be originated nor supported but by the uncorrupt public virtue of the representatives of the people of England.  Let it once got into the ordinary course of administration, and to me all hopes of reformation are gone.  I am far from knowing or believing that this bill will increase the influence of the crown.  We all know that the crown has ever had some influence in the Court of Directors, and that it has been extremely increased by the acts of 1773 and 1780.  The gentlemen who, as part of their reformation, propose “a more active control on the part of the crown,” which is to put the Directors under a Secretary of State specially named for that purpose, must know that their project will increase it further.  But that old influence has had, and the new will have, incurable inconveniences, which cannot happen under