he would appoint the old offenders to correct the old offences; and he would render the vicious and the foolish wise and virtuous by salutary regulations.  He would appoint the wolf as guardian of the sheep; but he has invented a curious muzzle, by which this protecting wolf shall not be able to open his jaws above an inch or two at the utmost.  Thus his work is finished.  But I tell the right honorable gentleman, that controlled depravity is not innocence, and that it is not the labor of delinquency in chains that will correct abuses.  Will these gentlemen of the direction animadvert on the partners of their own guilt?  Never did a serious plan of amending of any old tyrannical establishment propose the authors and abettors of the abuses as the reformers of them.  If the undone people of India see their old oppressors in confirmed power, even by the reformation, they will expect nothing but what they will certainly feel,—­continuance, or rather an aggravation, of all their former sufferings.  They look to the seat of power, and to the persons who fill it; and they despise those gentlemen’s regulations as much as the gentlemen do who talk of them.

But there is a cure for everything.  Take away, say they, the Court of Proprietors, and the Court of Directors will do their duty.  Yes,—­as they have done it hitherto.  That the evils in India have solely arisen from the Court of Proprietors is grossly false.  In many of them the Directors were heartily concurring; in most of them they were encouraging, and sometimes commanding; in all they were conniving.

But who are to choose this well-regulated and reforming Court of Directors?—­Why, the very Proprietors who are excluded from all management, for the abuse of their power.  They will choose, undoubtedly, out of themselves, men like themselves; and those who are most forward in resisting your authority, those who are most engaged in faction or interest with the delinquents abroad, will be the objects of their selection.  But gentlemen say, that, when this choice is made, the Proprietors are not to interfere in the measures of the Directors, whilst those Directors are busy in the control of their common patrons and masters in India.  No, indeed, I believe they will not desire to interfere.  They will choose those whom they know may be trusted, safely trusted, to act in strict conformity to their common principles, manners, measures, interests, and connections.  They will want neither monitor nor control.  It is not easy to choose men to act in conformity to a public interest against their private; but a sure dependence may be had on those who are chosen to forward their private interest at the expense of the public.  But if the Directors should slip, and deviate into rectitude, the punishment is in the hands of the General Court, and it will surely be remembered to them at their next election.