To all the conditions proposed by his adversaries the mover of the bill perfectly agrees; and on his performance of them he rests his cause.  On the other hand, not the least objection has been taken with regard to the efficiency, the vigor, or the completeness of the scheme.  I am therefore warranted to assume, as a thing admitted, that the bills accomplish what both sides of the House demand as essential.  The end is completely answered, so for as the direct and immediate object is concerned.

But though there are no direct, yet there are various collateral objections made:  objections from the effects which this plan of reform for Indian administration may have on the privileges of great public bodies in England; from its probable influence on the constitutional rights, or on the freedom and integrity, of the several branches of the legislature.

Before I answer these objections, I must beg leave to observe, that, if we are not able to contrive some method of governing India well, which will not of necessity become the means of governing Great Britain ill, a ground is laid for their eternal separation, but none for sacrificing the people of that country to our Constitution.  I am, however, far from being persuaded that any such incompatibility of interest does at all exist.  On the contrary, I am certain that every means effectual to preserve India from oppression is a guard to preserve the British Constitution from its worst corruption.  To show this, I will consider the objections, which, I think, are four.

1st, That the bill is an attack on the chartered rights of men.

2ndly, That it increases the influence of the crown.

3rdly, That it does not increase, but diminishes, the influence of the crown, in order to promote the interests of certain ministers and their party.

4thly, That it deeply affects the national credit.

As to the first of these objections, I must observe that the phrase of “the chartered rights of men” is full of affectation, and very unusual in the discussion of privileges conferred by charters of the present description.  But it is not difficult to discover what end that ambiguous mode of expression, so often reiterated, is meant to answer.

The rights of men—­that is to say, the natural rights of mankind—­are indeed sacred things; and if any public measure is proved mischievously to affect them, the objection ought to be fatal to that measure, even if no charter at all could be set up against it.  If these natural rights are further affirmed and declared by express covenants, if they are clearly defined and secured against chicane, against power and authority, by written instruments and positive engagements, they are in a still better condition:  they partake not only of the sanctity of the object so secured, but of that solemn public faith itself which secures an object of such importance.  Indeed, this formal recognition,