to a certain duke,[42] who is now probably sitting quietly at a very good dinner directly under us, and acting high life below stairs, whilst we, his masters, are filling our mouths with unsubstantial sounds, and talking of hungry economy over his head.  But he is the elder branch of an ancient and decayed house, joined to and repaired by the reward of services done by another.  I respect the original title, and the first purchase of merited wealth and honor through all its descents, through all its transfers, and all its assignments.  May such fountains never be dried up!  May they ever flow with their original purity, and refresh and fructify the commonwealth for ages!

Sir, I think myself bound to give you my reasons as clearly and as fully for stopping in the course of reformation as for proceeding in it.  My limits are the rules of law, the rules of policy, and the service of the state.  This is the reason why I am not able to intermeddle with another article, which seems to be a specific object in several of the petitions:  I mean the reduction of exorbitant emoluments to efficient offices.  If I knew of any real efficient office which did possess exorbitant emoluments, I should be extremely desirous of reducing them.  Others may know of them:  I do not.  I am not possessed of an exact common measure between real service and its reward.  I am very sure that states do sometimes receive services which is hardly in their power to reward according to their worth.  If I were to give my judgment with regard to this country, I do not think the great efficient offices of the state to be overpaid.  The service of the public is a thing which cannot be put to auction and struck down to those who will agree to execute it the cheapest.  When the proportion between reward and service is our object, we must always consider of what nature the service is, and what sort of men they are that must perform it.  What is just payment for one kind of labor, and full encouragement for one kind of talents, is fraud and discouragement to others.  Many of the great offices have much duty to do, and much expense of representation to maintain.  A Secretary of State, for instance, must not appear sordid in the eyes of the ministers of other nations; neither ought our ministers abroad to appear contemptible in the courts where they reside.  In all offices of duty, there is almost necessarily a great neglect of all domestic affairs.  A person in high office can rarely take a view of his family-house.  If he sees that the state takes no detriment, the state must see that his affairs should take as little.