the interests of another Power should be subject to the veto of that Power, but no one has protested that Russia has lost her international status on account of the limitation imposed by the Treaty of Paris.  In like manner Mr. Reitz argues that the Transvaal, being free to conduct its diplomacy, and to make war, can fairly claim to be a Sovereign International State.  The assertion of this fact serves as an Ithuriel’s spear to bring into clear relief the significance of the revival by Mr. Chamberlain of the Suzerainty of 1881.  Upon this point Mr. Reitz gives us a plain straightforward narrative, the justice and accuracy of which will not be denied by anyone who, like Sir Edward Clarke, takes the trouble to read the official dispatches.

I turn with more interest to Mr. Reitz’s narrative of the precise differences of opinion which led to the breaking-off of negotiations between the two Governments.  Mr. Chamberlain, it will be remembered, said in his dispatch he had accepted nine-tenths of the conditions laid down by the Boers if the five years’ franchise was to be conceded.  What the tenth was which was not accepted Mr. Chamberlain has never told us, excepting that it was “a matter of form” which was “not worth a war.”  Readers of Mr. Reitz’s narrative will see that in the opinion of the Boers the sticking point was the question of suzerainty.  If Mr. Chamberlain would have endorsed Sir Alfred Milner’s declaration, and have said, as his High Commissioner did, that the question about suzerainty was etymological rather than political, and that he would say no more about it, following Lord Derby’s policy and abstaining from using a word which was liable to be misunderstood, there would have been no war.  So far as Mr. Reitz’s authority goes we are justified in saying that the war was brought about by the persistence of Mr. Chamberlain in reviving the claim of suzerainty which had been expressly surrendered in 1884, and which from 1884 to 1897 had never been asserted by any British Government.

Another point of great importance is the reference which Mr. Reitz makes to the Raid.  On this point he speaks with much greater moderation than many English critics of the Government.  Lord Loch will be interested in reading Mr. Reitz’s account of the way in which his visit to Pretoria was regarded by the Transvaal Government.  It shows that it was his visit which first alarmed the Boers, and compelled them to contemplate the possibility of having to defend their independence with arms.  But it was not until after the Jameson Raid that they began arming in earnest.  As there is so much controversy upon this subject, it may be well to quote here the figures from the Budget of the Transvaal Government, showing the expenditure before and after the Raid.