Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

It serves always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeeble the Public Administration.  It agitates the Community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one party against another, foments occasionally riot and insurrection.  It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption which find a facilitated access to the Government itself through the channels of party passions.  Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion, that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the Government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of Liberty.  This within certain limits is probably true; and in Governments of a Monarchical cast, Patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party.  But in those of a popular character, in Governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged.  From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose.  And, there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it.  A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.

It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those intrusted with its administrations, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another.  The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of Government, a real despotism.  A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of the position.  The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the Guardian of the Public Weal against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our country and under our own eyes.  To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them.  If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates.  But let there be no change by usurpation; for, though this in one instance may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free Governments are destroyed.  The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit, which the use can at any time yield.