The difference comes out chiefly in scouting, including all the flanking and advance guard business, extending for several miles to left and right, and in front and rear of an army column, by which that column feels its way through an enemy’s country.  The regulars usually carry out these tactics in long lines with wide intervals between the men.  But nothing is so conspicuous as a long line of men riding at fifty yards’ interval.  They can be detected a dozen miles off, and plenty of opportunities will occur for a mobile, cunning enemy like the Boers to lie in ambush and get a shot at the outsider.  Our regulars are better at this game than they used to be, but many lives have been lost at it.  On the other hand, Colonials adopt more the tactics of a Scotch gillie in a deer forest, whose object is to see, but not to be seen.  Sky-lines are avoided and cover taken every advantage of.  From places where a good view is to be obtained the country is intently studied; not by a horseman poised in relief like the Achilles statue in Hyde Park, but by a man who has left his horse on the reverse slope and lies hidden among the rocks with his glass.  Again, if a farm or suspicious-looking kopje has to be approached, this is partly encircled, and threatened or examined in flank or rear before being occupied; while if the place, a long range of hills for instance, has to be approached in front, a sudden left or right wheel at long range may often draw the enemy’s fire.  These are a few of the many expedients that sometimes suggest themselves to lessen risk.  In all, the first necessity is personal intelligence in the men and the habit of taking notice and thinking for themselves, faculties which the independent, self-reliant life of the Colonials has greatly developed.  Just the same holds good when it comes to shooting; choosing cover, keeping oneself hidden, creeping on from point to point without giving the enemy a fair shot, or detecting the probable bushes or rocks behind which an enemy may be lying, or any sign of his whereabouts.  The Tommy as he advances is apt to expose himself, because he doesn’t think.  The Colonial will get to the same spot perhaps quite unperceived.  This is why I say that our loss does not give an adequate idea of the work done by the corps.  The defence of the conical hill here at Relief’s Nek is a good example.  Our men hold the hill for several hours before the regulars come up, and lose one man.  As soon as the regulars arrive (though by this time the exposed places are known and the enemy located), they begin to lose men, and by the conclusion of the action have lost, I am told, over forty.  I think, and have often spoken so highly of our soldiers’ courage, that I don’t hesitate to point out their weakness.  They are lacking in personal intelligence.  For all their pluck, they don’t know how to look after themselves.  There have been, as you will have heard, many cases in which detached parties of our cavalry, mounted infantry, and yeomanry have been cut off and captured.  How often has this happened to the Colonials?