How different their reception on the present occasion!  How changed the aspect!  The hills, range after range, were now crowned with forts.  Fifty thousand of Russia’s best soldiers were behind those batteries, many of which were provided with casemates impenetrable [Page 188] to any ordinary projectile.  General Stoessel, a man of science, courage and experience, was in command; and he held General Nogi with a force of sixty or seventy thousand at bay for eleven months.  Prodigies of valour were performed on both sides, some of the more commanding positions being taken and retaken three or four times.

When, in September, the besiegers got possession of Wolf Hill, and with plunging shot smashed the remnant of the fleet, they offered generous terms to the defenders.  General Stoessel declined the offer, resolving to emulate Thermopylae, or believing, perhaps, in the possibility of rescue.  When, however, he saw the “203 Metre Hill” in their hands and knew his casemates would soon be riddled by heavy shot, in sheer despair he was forced to capitulate.  This was on the first day of the new year (1905).  His force had been reduced to half its original numbers, and of these no fewer than 14,000 were in hospital.

General Stoessel has been censured for not holding out until the arrival of the armada; but what could the armada have done had it appeared in the offing?  It certainly could not have penetrated the harbour, for in addition to fixed or floating mines it would have had to run the gauntlet of Togo’s fleet and its doom would have been precipitated.  One critic of distinction denounced Stoessel’s surrender as “shameful”; but is it not a complete vindication that his enemies applaud his gallant defence, and that his own government was satisfied that he had done his duty.[*]

[Footnote *:  Since writing this I have read the finding of the court-martial.  It has the air of an attempt to diminish the national disgrace by throwing blame on a brave commander.]

[Page 189] The Russian commander had marked out a new camp at Mukden, the chief city of the province and the cradle of the Manchu dynasty.  There he was allowed once more to intrench himself.  Was this because the Japanese were confident of their ability to compel him again to retire, or were they occupied with the task of filling up their depleted ranks?  If the latter was the cause, the Russians were doing the same; but near to their base and with full command of the sea, the Japanese were able to do it more expeditiously than their enemy.  Yet with all their facilities they were not ready to move on his works until winter imposed a suspension of hostilities.

On October 2 Kuropatkin published a boastful manifesto expressing confidence in the issue of the coming conflict—­trusting no doubt to the help of the three generals, December, January, and February.  Five months later, on March 8, 1905, he sent two telegrams to the Czar:  the first said “I am surrounded;” the second, a few hours later, conveyed the comforting intelligence “the army has escaped.”