For the springs of action it will be necessary to go back three centuries, to the time when Yermak crossed the Ural Mountains and made Russia an Asiatic power.  The conquest of Siberia was not to end in Siberia.  Russia saw in it a chance to enrich herself at the expense of weaker neighbours.  What but that motive led her, in 1858, to demand the Manchurian seacoast as the price of neutrality?  What but that led her to construct the longest railway in the world?  What but that impelled her to seek for it a second terminus on the Gulf of Pechili?

The occupation of Port Arthur and Liao-tung by the Japanese, in 1895, was a checkmate to Russia’s little game; and, supported by France and Germany, she gave her notice to quit.  During the Boxer War of 1900, Russia increased her forces in Manchuria to provide for the eventualities of a probable break-up, and after the peace her delay in fulfilling her promise of evacuation was tantamount to a refusal.

Had the Russians confined their attention to Manchuria they might have continued to remain in possession; but another feeble state offered itself as a tempting prize.  They set greedy eyes on Korea, made interest with an impoverished court, and obtained the privilege of navigating the Yalu and cutting [Page 183] timber on its banks.  This proceeding, though explained by the requirements of railway construction, aroused the suspicion and jealousy of the Japanese.  They knew it meant more than seeking an outlet for a lumber industry.  They knew it portended vassalage for Korea and ejection for themselves.  Had they not made war on China ten years before because they could brook no rival in the peninsula?  How could they tolerate the intrusion of Russia?  Not merely were their interests in Korea at stake; every advance of Russia in that quarter, with Korea for vassal or ally, was a menace to the existence of Japan.

The Japanese lost no time in entering a protest.  Russia resorted to the Fabian policy of delay as before; but she was dealing with a people whose pride and patriotism were not to be trifled with.  After protracted negotiations Japan sent an ultimatum in which she proposed to recognise Manchuria as Russia’s sphere of influence, provided Russia would recognise Japanese influence as paramount in Korea.  For a fortnight or more the Czar vouchsafed no reply.  Accustomed to being waited on, he put the paper in his pocket and kept it there while every train on the railway was pouring fresh troops into Manchuria.  Without waiting for a formal reply, or deigning to discuss modifications intended to gain time, the Japanese heard the hour strike and cleared for action.

They are reproached for opening hostilities without first formally declaring war.  In the age of chivalry a declaration of war was a solemn ceremony.  A herald standing on the border read or recited his [Page 184] master’s complaint and then hurled a spear across the boundary as an act of defiance.  In later times nothing more than a formal announcement is required, except for the information of neutrals and the belligerents’ own people.  The rupture of relations leaves both parties free to choose their line of action.  Japan, the newest of nations, naturally adopted the most modern method.