On Monday French with his cavalry brigade seized a drift or ford across the Riet ten or a dozen miles above Jacobsdal, and the two infantry divisions were so close behind him that on Tuesday Lord Roberts could report them both encamped beyond the river.  On Tuesday French was off again to the north with a cavalry brigade, a mounted infantry brigade, and a horse artillery brigade, a second cavalry brigade, under Colonel Gordon moving on his right.  By half-past five French was across the Modder River, having forced a drift and seized the hills beyond so as to secure the passage for the infantry, while Gordon had seized two drifts further to the west.  Between them the two cavalry commanders had captured five Boer laagers, and the slightness of the opposition they encounter proves that the Boers were completely surprised.  On Wednesday morning the sixth division was on the march to follow the cavalry, and the seventh division was to take the same direction on Wednesday afternoon.

These are all the facts reported until now, Thursday afternoon.  Let us see what they mean.  First of all, Lord Roberts has chosen his objective, the Boer force before Kimberley, on the right flank of the Boer front Stormberg—­Colesberg—­Magersfontein.  A blow delivered here and followed by a march into the Free State places Lord Roberts on the communications of the Boers now at Stormberg and Colesberg and between the two halves of the Boer army, of which one is on the border of Cape Colony and the other in Natal.  The objective, therefore, has been chosen with strategical insight.  In the next place forces have been concentrated for the blow.  Lord Roberts has four infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, and at least one brigade of mounted infantry, his total strength amounting to at least fifty thousand men.  Then there has been a skilful and successful attempt to distract the enemy’s attention, to conceal from him the nature of the movement and the force to be employed, and last, but not least, there has been the suddenness and the rapidity of movement essential to surprise.  These are the proofs of that breadth and simplicity of conception and of that mastery in execution which are the marks of the best generalship.

But there is in the best work more than breadth of mind and strength of hand.  The details fit in with the design and repay the closest scrutiny.  The march of twenty-five thousand men round Jacobsdal towards the Modder tactically turns the Boer position at Magersfontein, so that it need not be carried by a frontal attack.  But it also places the British force on the direct line of the Boer communications with Bloemfontein, and if Commandant Cronje values these communications he must either make a precipitate retreat by Boshof, offering his flank during the process to attack by French, or must attack the sixth and seventh divisions on their march from the Riet to the Modder.  But in either case he has to reckon with the Guards and ninth divisions which are not mentioned