not be forgotten.  The British soldier to-day, as in the past, proves to be a staunch support to any general.  To-day, however, he has leaders who, taking them all round, are probably better qualified than any of their predecessors.  The divisional generals are all picked for their known grip of the business of war; among the brigadiers there are such devoted students of their profession as Lyttelton and Hildyard, and the younger officers of to-day are more zealous in their business and better instructed than at any previous period.  There should be less in this war than in any that the British Army has waged of that incompetence of the subordinates which in past campaigns has often caused the commanders more anxiety than all the enemy’s doings.

Yet at every point the Boers appear to outnumber our troops.  The question arises how this came about; either the Government has not sent troops enough, or the force given to the Commander-in-Chief has been wrongly distributed.  Sir Redvers Buller has done the best he could in difficult conditions.  Ladysmith had to be relieved, and he has taken more than half of his force for the purpose.  He might have wished to take a third division, but if he had done so Kimberley might have fallen, and the rising at the Cape have spread so fast and so far that the defeat of Joubert would not have restored the balance.  Accordingly the smaller half of the force was left in the Cape Colony.  Here also there were two tasks.  To push back the invasion was a slow business, and if meantime Kimberley had fallen, the insurrection would have become general.  Accordingly a minimum force was set to stem the invasion and a maximum force devoted to the relief of Kimberley.  The difficulties, therefore, arose not merely from the strategy in South Africa but from the delay of the Government to send enough troops in time.  The fact that Sir George White with a small force was left for two months unsupported produced the rising at the Cape, and compelled the division of the British Army Corps, in, consequence of which the whole force is reduced to a perilous numerical weakness at each of four points.  But the Army Corps, the cavalry division, and the force for the line of communications, have now to wait three weeks before they can be strengthened.  It was known to the Government before the end of October that Ladysmith would be invested and need relief, that the Cape Dutch would rise, and that unless Kimberley were helped the rising would become dangerous.  Yet the despatch of the first transport of the fifth division was delayed until November 24th.  Has the Government even now begun to take the war seriously?  Do the members of the Cabinet at this eleventh hour understand that failure to crush the Boers means breakdown for the Empire, and that a prolonged struggle with them carries with it grave danger of the intervention of other Powers?  Does Lord Lansdowne continue to direct the movement of reinforcements according to his own unmilitary judgment modified by that of one or more of his unmilitary colleagues?  I decline to believe that Lord Wolseley has arranged or accepted without protest this new system of sending out the Army in fragments, each of which may be invested or used up before the next can arrive.