have come among them, marched into their towns, proclaimed the annexation of the country, and commandeered the citizens.  If this goes on the Boer armies will soon be swelled to great dimensions by recruits from the British colony, a process which cannot go on much longer without shaking the faith of the whole Dutch population in the supremacy of Great Britain.  Some manifestation of British strength, energy, and will is evidently urgently needed in this region.  Moreover, Kimberley is hard beset, and its fall would seem to the whole countryside to be the visible sign of a British collapse.  No wonder, then, that Sir Redvers Duller has sent Lord Methuen as soon as he could be ready to the relief of Kimberley.  The column consists of the Brigade of Guards, the Ninth Brigade, made up of such battalions as were at hand to replace Hildyard’s brigade (sent to Natal), of a naval detachment, a cavalry regiment, and two or three batteries, besides local levies.  Kimberley is five or six days’ march from Orange River, and at some point on the way the Boers will no doubt try to stop the advance.  I feel confident that Lord Methuen, whom I know as an accomplished tactician, will so win his battle as not to need to do the same work twice over.

The advance of Lord Methuen’s division renders imperative the protection of the long railway line from Cape Town to Orange River.  This seems to be entrusted to General Forestier-Walker’s forces, reduced to two battalions, and to General Wauchope’s Highland brigade.  One battalion only is with General Gatacre at Queenstown, and two battalions of General Lyttelton’s brigade which have reached Cape Town are as yet unaccounted for in the telegrams.

How, then, if all his forces are thus employed could Sir Redvers Buller, by taking thought, have added anything to Sir C.F.  Clery’s force on the Mooi River?  The answer is that a commander’s decision must usually be a choice of risks.  To have sent on to Natal a part of the troops now in Cape Colony would have been to have increased the danger of the Cape Dutch going over to the Boers.  Which was the less of two possible evils—­the spread of disaffection in the Cape Colony or the loss of Sir George White’s force?  No one at home can decide with confidence because the knowledge here available of the situation in either colony is very limited.  Subject to this reserve, I should be disposed to think the danger in Natal the more serious, and the chance of losing Colonel Kekewich’s force a mere trifle in comparison with the defeat of General Joubert, for the effect of Joubert’s defeat would be felt on the Orange River, whereas the relief of Kimberley can hardly produce an appreciable effect on the situation in Natal.