and felt confident that the modus vivendi would lead finally to a complete cessation of British interference and to best relations and prosperous conditions for all instead.  He also cautioned the Government at Pretoria, giving chapter and verse, against counting upon “the arm of man.”  They would find they had trusted on reeds—­it would be so in regard to any foreign help, and even in regard to men of their own nation in the Cape Colony.

During one of the interviews Mr. Reitz had remarked that he had a special theory in regard to the situation; but it varied from that of the President, who, in reality, was King, and whose will overcame all opposition.

MR. CHAMBERLAIN’S POLICY TO AVERT WAR

Seeing that twenty years of patient, loyal endeavours and friendly conciliatory proceedings following upon the rehabilitation of the Transvaal independence had utterly failed in advancing the object of uniting the English and Boer races, and that instead the existing gulf was ever widening through the spread of those fell Afrikaner Bond doctrines, it had become imperative, on the part of British statesmen, to employ special efforts to overcome the serious menace hanging over South Africa.  The critical situation designedly brought about by the action of the Transvaal Government and by the influence of the Bond party indicated the remedy.  A liberal franchise in favour of the Uitlanders would at one stroke correct that evil, and counteract the other impending danger as well.  With a large accession of legitimized voters working in accord with England’s desire for peace and progress, that good influence would be potent, first to shackle Bond action and ultimately to reduce it to Colonial limits.  The Transvaal would then no longer be the giant ally, the arsenal, and the treasury of the Afrikaner Bond, and that organisation would then be checkmated into impotence for evil.

The success of such a remedial and defensive measure would naturally depend upon the adequacy of the franchise aimed at.  Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues were not a little sanguine in expecting that a five years’ qualification for voting and a representation equal to one-fifth of the total number of seats in the Legislature would be effective for all that which was needed; nor could it be averred that the Transvaal burghers would be swamped out thereby.

The Bond chiefs did not fail to at once penetrate the object when the demand for a five years’ franchise was made, and in vain did Sir Alfred display that firm attitude and exhaust his arguments at the historic Bloemfontein conference.  He had pointed out to President Krueger in a rudimentary fashion which was no doubt convincing enough—­that it was incompatible with professions of concord and desire for peace while persisting in excluding from representation a large majority of the population accustomed to and expecting liberal treatment, and