Bond.  These were the supreme objects for peaceful progress and not for annexation.  Solemn assurances from highest quarters were repeatedly given that no designs existed against the integrity of the Republic, that nothing unfriendly lurked behind the franchise demand, but that necessity dictated it for general good and the preservation of peace.  Nor were other diplomatic means left unemployed to ensure the acceptance of the franchise reform.  In addition to firmness of attitude and a display of actual force, most of the other Powers, including the United States of America, were induced to add their weight of persuasion in urging upon the Transvaal the adoption of the measures demanded by England for correcting the existing trouble.  It may be urged that the display of force in sending the first batches of troops would have afforded grounds for exasperation, and be construed by the Transvaal as a menace and actual hostility, tending to precipitate a conflict which it was so earnestly intended to avoid.  To this may be replied that the 20,000 men sent in August were readily viewed as placing the hitherto undermanned Colonial garrisons upon an appropriate peace effective only; but not so with respect to the army corps of 50,000 men despatched in September—­this was felt as an intended restraint against “Bond” projects, to enforce the observance of any agreement which the Transvaal might for the nonce assent to, and above all it was tending, unless at once opposed by the Bond, to weaken its ranks by producing hesitation and ultimate defection from that body; the die was thus to be cast, duplicity appeared to be played out—­the ultimatum of 9th October was the outcome; and England, though unprepared, could not possibly accept it otherwise than as a wilful challenge to war.

As the pursuit of our study will show, the success of Mr. Chamberlain’s diplomacy to avert war depended upon the very slender prospects that the Transvaal Government might have been induced to waver, and finally to break with the Afrikaner Bond—­a forlorn hope indeed, considering the perfection which that formidable organization had reached.  Its cherished objects were not meant to be abandoned.  The advice of “Bond” leaders prevailed.  War was declared and the Rubicon crossed in enthusiastic expectations of soon realizing the long-deferred Bond motto:  “The expulsion of the hateful English.”

It is true the Transvaal had made a show of acquiescence to British and foreign pressure.  This first took the shape of an offer of a seven years’ franchise, and then one of five years, exceeding even Mr. Milner’s demands as to the number of Uitlander representation.  That of seven years was so fenced in with nugatory trammels and conditions that it had for those reasons to be rejected; whilst that at five years was coupled with the equally unacceptable conditions that the claim of suzerainty should be renounced, and that in all other respects the Transvaal should be recognised as absolutely independent in terms of the Sand River Convention of 1852.