CHAPTER XV

THE IRISH CONSTITUTION[166]

I have dealt with the major issues of Home Rule.  The exclusion or retention of Irish Members at Westminster, and the powers—­above all, the financial powers—­of the Irish State, are the two points of cardinal importance.  As I have shown, they are inseparably connected, and form, in reality, one great question.

I have endeavoured to prove that from whatever angle we approach that central issue, whether we argue from representation to powers, or from powers to representation, and whether the particular powers we argue from be financial, legislative, or executive; whether we place Irish, British, or Imperial interests in the forefront of our exposition—­we are led irresistibly to the colonial solution—­that is, to the cessation of Irish representation at Westminster, coupled with a concession to Ireland of the full legislative and executive authority appropriate to that measure of independence, and, above all, with fiscal autonomy.

All the other provisions of the Bill are secondary.  They may be divided into two categories, which necessarily overlap: 

1.  Provisions concerning Ireland only.

2.  Provisions defining the Imperial authority over Ireland.

The structure of the Irish Legislature, the position of the Irish Judiciary, the safeguards for minorities, the provision made for existing servants of the State, the statutory arrangements, if any, for the future reorganization of the Irish Police—­these and other questions are of great intrinsic importance, and need the most careful discussion; but they are altogether subordinate to those we have already considered.  If it be over-sanguine to hope, in Ireland’s interest, that they will be discussed in a calm and dispassionate way, we can at least demand that those provisions belonging to the second category, which present no appreciable difficulty, will not excite bitter and barren disputes like those of 1893.

It is not within the scope of this volume to discuss exhaustively the secondary provisions of the Bill, or to suggest the exact statutory form which those provisions, major or minor, should take.  In this chapter I shall deal briefly with matters which I have hitherto left aside, and incidentally give more precision to the points upon which I have already suggested a conclusion, in both cases indicating, so far as possible, the most useful precedents and parallels from other Constitutions.  The result will be the rough sketch of a Home Rule Bill.

PREAMBLE.

“Whereas it is expedient that without impairing or restricting the supreme authority of Parliament, an Irish Legislature should be created, etc.”  So ran the opening sentence of the Home Rule Bill of 1893.  The words I have italicized are harmless but superfluous.  They have never appeared in the Constitutions granted to Colonies, even at periods when the Colonies were most distrusted.  Nothing can impair the supreme authority of Parliament.