VIII.

ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES OF HOME RULE FINANCE[149]

Historically, these fall into two classes; though, as I shall show, they are for all intents and purposes merged in one to-day.

The two classes are—­(1) The Gladstonian; (2) the “Contract.”

1. Mr. Gladstone’s Schemes.—­It is unnecessary to examine these in close detail, though, if the reader cares to do so, he will find details set forth in the Appendix.  Four outstanding features were common to the schemes both of 1886 and 1893:  (a) Permanent Imperial control over the imposition of Customs and Excise; (b) Irish control over all other taxation; (c) an annual Irish contribution to Imperial expenditure; (d) Imperial payment of part cost of the Irish Police.

With regard to (a), the most important point of difference in the two Bills was that under the first Ireland was credited with her whole “collected” revenue from Customs and Excise, under the second (as amended) with only her “true” revenue, which was less than the former by L1,700,000.  Another point in which the two Bills differed was the permission to Ireland, under the Bill of 1893, after six years, to collect her own Excise.  Both imposition and collection were wholly reserved under the Bill of 1886.  I have already given grounds for the impolicy of retaining control over Customs and Excise.  Let me only ask the reader, in conclusion, to figure the situation.  How could Ireland frame a financial policy?  Three-quarters of the revenue, as at present levied, of a country profoundly dissimilar economically from Great Britain, and in need of drastic reforms of expenditure and marked changes in taxation, would be permanently outside the reach of an Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, and, in spite of the representation at Westminster which Imperial control would entail, would in the long-run fluctuate according to British needs and notions.  In the long-run, I repeat; but incidentally there would be sharp and damaging conflicts.  Occasions might occur like that of 1909, when the majority of Irishmen, rightly or wrongly, resented the form of new taxation, and would have secured the rejection of the Budget had not that step been hurtful to the prospects of Home Rule.  It will be useless to blame either Ireland or Great Britain.  Every country is bound to study its own circumstances.  A similar crisis would have imperilled even the strongest Federation.  We are not in the least concerned at the moment with the goodness or badness of that famous Budget.  We are concerned with the effect on the relations of the two countries, and with the indefeasible right of Ireland and Great Britain to do what they consider best for their own interests.