It will be clear, I think, now, in 1911, that this latter proposal is not worth revival.  No substantial amendment of the Act should properly be made without the formal consent of the Irish Legislature, representing Irish public opinion, and the prior consultation with the Irish Cabinet which such consent would imply.  If the lamentable necessity ever arose of amending the Act against the wishes of Ireland, the sudden invasion of Westminster by a body of angry Irish Members, too small to affect the result (for otherwise the attempt to amend would not be made) and large enough to revive the old political dislocation and passion, would not simplify the process of amendment or be of value to anybody concerned.  The proposal was probably only suggested by a vague leaning towards the Federal principle, which, in the present case, we should certainly reject.  It serves indeed as one more illustration of the anomalies which might result from the inclusion of Irish Members at Westminster.  No more unhealthy position could be imagined than one which would render it possible for an amendment of the Home Rule Act, whether in the direction of greater latitude or of stricter limitation, to depend solely upon the Irish vote in an Assembly predominately non-Irish.  That is not to the discredit of Ireland.  The system would be just as indefensible, whatever the subordinate State concerned.  It would be Federalism run mad, and would make Alexander Hamilton turn in his grave.  It is worth while to note that, even under a sane and normal Federal system, the Irish Constitution would be less easily alterable in either direction than under the plan of treating her as a self-governing Colony.  In the latter case action is direct and simple, while most Federal Constitutions are extraordinarily difficult to amend.  The Dominion of Canada is only an apparent exception.

I turn lastly to Finance, the point which most closely affects representation at Westminster, and which distinguishes any form of quasi-Federal Home Rule most sharply from its alternative, “Colonial” Home Rule.

All Federal systems necessarily involve a certain amount of joint finance between the superior and the inferior Government.  The distribution of financial powers varies widely in different Federations, but all have this feature in common—­that the central or superior Government controls Customs and Excise, and is to a large degree financed by means of the revenue derived from those sources.  The United States Government, as distinguished from that of the individual States, pays in this way for almost its entire expenditure.[94] So does the Dominion of Canada;[95] while in the Australian Commonwealth the receipts from Customs and Excise alone more than cover the whole Commonwealth expenditure.[96]