In speaking of powers reserved or delegated, and of residuary or unallocated powers, I have thus far referred only to powers which must be exercised, or at any rate may need to be exercised, if not by the subordinate legislature, then by the superior Parliament.  Those restrictions on the Irish Legislature which are imposed in order to protect the religious or economic interests of a minority within the State, or as a recognition that there are certain kinds of laws which it is morally wrong to pass, fall into an altogether different category.  By implication they morally bind the superior Parliament too, and are irrelevant, therefore, to the question of representation.  They will be necessary, no doubt, in the coming Irish Bill, though they need not be so extensive as those which are to be found in Clause 4 of the Bill of 1893, some of which are borrowed from the famous anti-slavery amendments of 1865-1869 to the Constitution of the United States.[92] In inserting them we shall again be following the “Federal” rather than the “Colonial” model.  No such restrictions have been imposed by the Mother Country upon any self-governing Colony.  The nearest approach, perhaps, to such a tendency was the provision in the Transvaal Constitution of 1906 (Section 39), that “any law whereby persons not of European birth or descent may be subjected or made liable to any disabilities or restrictions to which persons of European birth or descent are not also subjected or made liable” should be specially “reserved”—­that is, sent home by the Governor—­for the signification of the Royal pleasure; but no similar provision appeared in the Act of 1909 for constituting the South African Union.  In Federal systems, on the other hand, such restrictions, taking the form of self-denying ordinances, are common, whether appearing in the Federal Constitution itself or in the subordinate State Constitutions.  The Constitution of the United States, for example, in addition to the anti-slavery provisions noted above, enacts that the National Government cannot (by Amendment I.) establish any religion or prohibit its free exercise, or (by Amendment V.) take private property for public use without just compensation, or (by Article 1, Sec. 9) grant a title of nobility.  Neither (by Amendment XIV. and Article 1, Sec. 10 respectively) can a State do these things.  By Article 1, Sec. 10, a State cannot pass a law impairing the obligation of a contract.  Exactly similar restrictions appear in many of the individual State Constitutions.  Others forbid the establishment of any church or sect; the introduction of armed men “for the suppression of domestic violence”; “perpetuities or monopolies,” and a variety of other things.  Analogous provisions are to be found in the British North America Act, 1867 (constituting the Dominion of Canada), where the provincial Legislatures are forbidden to interfere with certain rights and privileges of religious bodies in the matter of education.  There are no limitations