2.  Inclusion in full numbers (say 70) for limited purposes.  This (with the figure of 80) was Mr. Gladstone’s original proposal of 1893, and it took the form of a clause known as the “In and Out Clause,” which purported to divide all Parliamentary business into Imperial, Irish, and non-Irish business, and to give Irish Members the right to vote only on Imperial and Irish subjects.  Mr. Gladstone never disguised his view that a sound classification was impracticable, and put forward the clause, frankly, as a tentative scheme for the discussion of the House.  Like its successor, the “Omnes omnia” Clause, it was riddled with criticism, and it was eventually withdrawn.  Without investigating details, the reader will perceive at once the hopeless confusion arising from an attempt to inject a tincture of Federalism into a unitary Parliament, forming part of an unwritten Constitution of great age and infinite delicacy.  It is not merely that it is absolutely impossible to distinguish rigidly between Imperial, Irish, and British business.  The great objection is that there would be two alternating majorities in an Assembly which is, and must be, absolutely governed by a party majority, and which, through that majority, controls the Executive.  It “passed the wit of man,” said Mr. Gladstone, to separate in practice the Legislative and Executive functions in the British Constitution.  At present a hostile vote in the House of Commons overturns the Ministry of the day and changes the whole British and Imperial administration.  A hostile vote, therefore, determined by the Irish Members, on a question affecting Ireland, such as the application to Ireland of a British Bill, would seriously embarrass the Ministry, if it did not overturn it.  The log-rolling and illicit pressure which this state of things would encourage may be easily imagined.  A Ministry might find itself after a General Election in the position of having a majority for some purposes and not for others.  That was actually the case in 1893, when Mr. Gladstone, with a majority, including the Irish Nationalists, of only 40, was carrying his Bill through Parliament.  It is actually the case now, in the sense that if the Irish Nationalists voted with the Opposition, the Ministry would be defeated.  Any change for the better in Irish sentiment towards Great Britain would pro tanto mitigate the difficulty, but would not remove it, and might, as I suggested above, increase it, by the creation of a solid Irish vote.  If Great Britain resents the present system, she alone is to blame.  As long as she insists on keeping the Irish Members out of Ireland, where they ought to be, she thoroughly deserves their tyranny, and would be wise to get rid of it by the means they suggest.  Until they are given Home Rule, they are not only justified in using their power, but are bound, in duty and honour, to use it.  To reproduce in the Home Rule Bill, albeit in a modified form, conditions which might lead to the same results as before would surely be a gratuitous act of unwisdom.