But with the possibility of responsible government granted, it must be confessed that the arguments against “Quebec Home Rule” as a measure of practical politics at the present moment, are insuperable.  In the first place there is no question in the coming Bill of federalizing the United Kingdom on the lines of the Dominion of Canada—­that is, of constructing a new Federal Parliament elected by the whole realm, together with new local Legislatures elected by the various fractions of the realm.  Scottish and Welsh Home Rule are in the air, but they are not practical issues.  English Home Rule is not even in the air.  I mean that Englishmen, whatever their views on the congestion of Parliamentary business owing to the pressure of Irish, Welsh, and Scottish affairs, have not seriously considered the idea of a subordinate Legislature exclusively English, which would be just as essential a feature of a completely federalized kingdom as subordinate Legislatures exclusively Irish, Scottish, and Welsh.

Not that it is essential to the federalization of the United Kingdom that Ireland, Scotland, England, and Wales, should all have separate Legislature.  Any one of these fractions could coalesce with another or others in a joint Legislature.  It would be technically possible, though highly unreasonable, to go to the extreme of giving Great Britain, regarded as one Province, a separate Legislature; Ireland, regarded as another Province, a separate Legislature; and, above these two subordinate bodies, a new Imperial Parliament representing the whole realm.  Such a dual Federation was nearly coming about in Canada, when Ontario and Quebec dissolved their Union and resolved to federate.  It became a quadruple Federation, owing to the adhesion of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; but in a dual form it would have worked just as well.  It is scarcely necessary to say that the disparity in population, resources, and power between Ireland and Great Britain render a dual Federation, which, of course, involves three Legislatures, chimerical.  What I want to insist on is that, whatever subdivisions are adopted, it is absolutely essential to every Federation that there should be a division of powers between a central and at least two local Legislatures—­three altogether.  That is the minimum.  Other things are also essential, but for the moment we can confine ourselves to the outstanding requirement.  Now, there is no question in the coming Bill of any such Federation.  Later years may see such a development, whether from pressure of work on the Imperial Parliament or from irresistible demand for Home Rule from Scotland or Wales, or both, but not next year.  The Bill will contemplate two Parliaments, not three, namely, the existing Imperial Parliament and the Irish Legislature.  There is, therefore, no question of Federal Home Rule, and the term “Federal,” as applied to Irish Home Rule at the present time, is meaningless.