It may have been these considerations which in the War of American Independence induced so fine an officer as Howe to be strongly in favour of a reversion to the old system.  The vital theatre was then again across the Atlantic, and there was no serious preparation for invasion.  It should also be borne in mind in judging Howe against Hawke, that in the Seven Years’ War we had such a preponderance at sea as permitted ample reserves to nourish a close blockade, whereas in the latter war we were numerically inferior to the hostile coalition.  Since it was impossible to prevent the French reaching the West Indies and North America if they so determined, our policy was to follow them with equal fleets and reduce the home force as low as that policy demanded and as was consistent with a reasonable degree of safety.  The force required might well be inferior to the enemy, since it was certain that all attempts upon the Channel would be made with an unwieldy and ill-knit force composed of Spanish and French units.

In Howe’s opinion this particular situation was not to be solved by attempting to close Brest, and nothing can be more misleading than to stretch such an opinion beyond the circumstances it was intended to meet.  He did not consider it was in his power to close the port.  The enemy, he held, could always be in readiness to escape after a gale of wind by which the blockading squadron would be drawn off or dispersed, the ships much damaged, and the enemy enheartened.  “An enemy,” he said, “is not to be restrained from putting to sea by a station taken off their port with a barely superior squadron.”  The experience of 1805 appears to contradict him.  Then a barely superior squadron did succeed in preventing Ganteaume’s exit, but though the squadron actually employed was barely superior, it had ample fleet reserves to sustain its numbers in efficiency.  It was, moreover, only for a short time that it had to deal with any real effort to escape.  After May 20th, Ganteaume was forbidden to put to sea.  There were certainly several occasions during that famous blockade when he could have escaped to the southward had Napoleon wished it.

This case, then, cannot be taken to condemn Howe’s judgment.  His special function in the war plan was, with a force reduced to defensive strength, to prevent the enemy obtaining command of our home waters.  It was certainly not his duty to undertake operations to which his force was not equal.  His first duty was to keep it in being for its paramount purpose.  To this end he decided on open blockade based on a general reserve at Spithead or St. Helen’s, where he could husband the ships and train his recruits, while at the same time he protected our trade and communications and harassed those of the enemy.  Kempenfelt, than whom there was no warmer advocate of activity, entirely approved the policy at least for the winter months, and in his case no one will be found to suggest that the idea was prompted by